1200KM / simulation
T1611 Escape to Host — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment. There are multiple ways an adversary may escape from a…
Technique description
Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment. There are multiple ways an adversary may escape from a…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Deploy container using nsenter container escape
Procedure 0b2f9520-a17a-4671-9dba-3bd034099fff; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Privilege Escalation via Docker Volume Mapping
Procedure 39fab1bc-fcb9-406f-bc2e-fe03e42ff0e4; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Mount host filesystem to escape privileged Docker container
Procedure 6c499943-b098-4bc6-8d38-0956fc182984; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.