1200KM / telemetry
Container Creation — Detection Telemetry
Creation of a runtime container object.
Collection and providers
Collect runtime create events and image/container IDs; correlate with API audit to establish the initiating identity.
- Docker Engine events: Daemon lifecycle events for containers and images; collect continuously.
- Kubernetes API audit: Control-plane context in Kubernetes, not a replacement for runtime observations.
Configuration
- Subscribe to the lab daemon event stream with filters for the relevant object/action; send it to a durable collector.
- Record runtime/container ID, image digest, action, timestamp and host. Join orchestrator identities where available.
- Use a protected collector connection. Docker socket access is privileged; never expose it publicly or grant it to the website.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0072",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"container_id": "lab-container-1",
"image_digest": "sha256:bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
"action": "create"
}
}Visibility and validation
Runtime event history is bounded and can be lost without continuous collection. Image tags are mutable; pin digests. A lifecycle event is not a full process or file audit.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1053.007 · Container Orchestration Job · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1059.013 · Container CLI/API · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1204 · User Execution · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1204.003 · Malicious Image · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1496.001 · Compute Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1543 · Create or Modify System Process · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1543.005 · Container Service · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1611 · Escape to Host · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.