T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol — Attack Simulation

DC0025 collection page — Explicitly select relevant object-read data events; keep principal, key, request ID and result without object contents.

Providers and collection configuration

• AWS CloudTrail for S3: Bucket control-plane events and explicitly selected object data events.
• Google Cloud Audit Logs: Cloud Storage access requires the relevant audit category and permissions.
• Azure storage resource logs: Use resource-specific data-plane diagnostics; Activity Log alone does not describe blob reads.

• Choose only the lab buckets/containers and prefixes. Enable read/write data-event collection when object access is needed; management events alone are insufficient.
• Keep administrative changes separately from object reads/writes. Set a cost budget and retention limit before enabling high-volume data logging.
• Preserve object version/key, requesting identity, action, source address, result and request ID. Verify the collector actually receives one benign read and one benign write.

Required normalized fields: action, bucket, key, actor, result.

[
  {
    "Name": "LabObjectReads",
    "FieldSelectors": [
      {
        "Field": "eventCategory",
        "Equals": [
          "Data"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "resources.type",
        "Equals": [
          "AWS::S3::Object"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "resources.ARN",
        "StartsWith": [
          "arn:aws:s3:::lab-bucket/demo/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "readOnly",
        "Equals": [
          "true"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
]

Replace the placeholder with an owned lab bucket/prefix. Review costs and merge with required selectors; applying selectors can replace an existing selection. This does not enable management-event retention or object-write coverage.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0025",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "action": "get_object",
    "bucket": "lab-bucket",
    "key": "demo.txt",
    "actor": "lab-reader",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Storage metadata, listing, object access and bucket administration are different operations. Do not equate a successful request with proven exfiltration or complete content visibility.

DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.

Providers and collection configuration

• PowerShell Script Block Logging: Script content via event 4104 when configured; channel depends on PowerShell edition.
• Sysmon process events: Interpreter launch and parent context, not full script content.
• Linux Audit: execve-family execution context; shell built-ins need additional instrumentation.

• Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
• Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
• On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0064",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "interpreter": "/bin/sh",
    "command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
    "actor_uid": 1000,
    "session_id": "lab-session-1"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.

Providers and collection configuration

• Windows Security auditing: Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.

• Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
• For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
• Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0055",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "access": "read",
    "actor": "LAB\\analyst",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

DC0061 collection page — Use file-integrity monitoring or scoped OS file-write auditing for general changes. Sysmon 2 records creation-time changes; it is not a general file-write event.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: path, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0061",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "attribute": "content_hash",
    "before": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "after": "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0082",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "initiated": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
• AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

MITRE detection strategy

9 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

• DNS TOR Proxies — test; service: dns; product: zeek.
• Tap Driver Installation - Security — test; product: windows; service: security; definition: Requirements: The System Security Extension audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697.
• Tap Driver Installation — test; product: windows; service: system.
• Powershell DNSExfiltration — test; product: windows; category: ps_script; definition: Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled.
• Data Export From MSSQL Table Via BCP.EXE — test; category: process_creation; product: windows.
• PUA - Restic Backup Tool Execution — experimental; product: windows; category: process_creation.
• Copy From Or To Admin Share Or Sysvol Folder — test; category: process_creation; product: windows.
• Suspicious Redirection to Local Admin Share — test; category: process_creation; product: windows.
• Tap Installer Execution — test; category: process_creation; product: windows.

• S0203 Hydraq — malware.

  Hydraq connects to a predefined domain on port 443 to exfil gathered information.[Symantec Hydraq Jan 2010]

  Exact relationship: relationship--c5a0e330-ec5a-49cc-95b8-b7a5c49bd500
• S0428 PoetRAT — malware.

  PoetRAT has used a .NET tool named dog.exe to exiltrate information over an e-mail account.[Talos PoetRAT April 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--1b29f7b8-78fe-4bae-b943-59641a12a023
• S0482 Bundlore — malware.

  Bundlore uses the <code>curl -s -L -o</code> command to exfiltrate archived data to a URL.[20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques]

  Exact relationship: relationship--0c994569-1793-4d11-821e-bbf7c6c98278
• S0503 FrameworkPOS — malware.

  FrameworkPOS can use DNS tunneling for exfiltration of credit card data.[SentinelOne FrameworkPOS September 2019]

  Exact relationship: relationship--8f064578-a664-4d9e-a907-ec85ef5839b0
• S0631 Chaes — malware.

  Chaes has exfiltrated its collected data from the infected machine to the C2, sometimes using the MIME protocol.[Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020]

  Exact relationship: relationship--682b7ced-a03b-4403-a058-9bc627c62f16
• S0641 Kobalos — malware.

  Kobalos can exfiltrate credentials over the network via UDP.[ESET Kobalos Jan 2021]

  Exact relationship: relationship--91cd43d9-17cb-41d3-b62d-4b79030f4384
• S0677 AADInternals — tool.

  AADInternals can directly download cloud user data such as OneDrive files.[AADInternals Documentation]

  Exact relationship: relationship--fc2c7ee8-31f1-49f6-afd5-69443db69ab7

Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

Local to Remote

Upon successful execution, tar will compress /Users/* directory and password protect the file modification of `Users.tar.gz.enc` as output.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7c3cb337-35ae-4d06-bf03-3032ed2ec268 · macos, linux · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

• user_name: username for domain (type string; source default atomic)
• password: password for user (type string; source default atomic)
• domain: target SSH domain (type url; source default target.example.com)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

This test demonstrates how an attacker can exfiltrate sensitive information by encoding it as a subdomain (using base64 encoding) and
making DNS queries via the dig command to a controlled DNS server.

Pinned Atomic procedure · a27916da-05f2-4316-a3ee-feec67a437be · macos, linux · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

• dns_port: Attacker's DNS server port (type integer; source default 53)
• attacker_dns_server: Attacker's DNS server address (type string; source default 8.8.8.8)
• secret_info: secret info that will be exfiltirated (type string; source default this is a secret info)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

• dig command

DNSExfiltrator enables the transfer (exfiltration) of a file over a DNS request covert channel. This is basically a data leak testing tool allowing to exfiltrate data over a covert channel.
!!! Test will fail without a domain under your control with A record and NS record !!!
See this github page for more details - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator

Pinned Atomic procedure · c943d285-ada3-45ca-b3aa-7cd6500c6a48 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

• password: Password used to encrypt the data to be exfiltrated (type string; source default atomic)
• domain: The domain name to use for DNS requests (type string; source default target.example.com)
• ps_module: DNSExfiltrator powershell ps_module (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\dnsexfil.ps1)
• doh: Google or CloudFlare DoH (DNS over HTTP) server (type string; source default google)
• time: The time in milliseconds to wait between each DNS request (type string; source default 500)
• encoding: Set to '-b32' to use base32 encoding of data. Might be required by some DNS resolvers. (type string; source default )

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

• DNSExfiltrator powershell file must exist on disk at specified location (#{ps_module})

Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH

Remote to Local

Upon successful execution, sh will spawn ssh contacting a remote domain (default: target.example.com) writing a tar.gz file.

Pinned Atomic procedure · f6786cc8-beda-4915-a4d6-ac2f193bb988 · macos, linux · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

• domain: target SSH domain (type url; source default target.example.com)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

• M1018 User Account Management

  Configure user permissions groups and roles for access to cloud storage.[Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019] Implement strict Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent access to storage solutions except for the applications, users, and services that require access.[Amazon S3 Security, 2019] Ensure that temporary access tokens are issued rather than permanent credentials, especially when access is being granted to entities outside of the internal security boundary.[Amazon AWS Temporary Security Credentials]

• M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions

  Use access control lists on cloud storage systems and objects.

• M1030 Network Segmentation

  Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.[TechNet Firewall Design]

• M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

  Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.

• M1037 Filter Network Traffic

  Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. Cloud service providers support IP-based restrictions when accessing cloud resources. Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data.

• M1057 Data Loss Prevention

  Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being uploaded via web browsers.