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T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.[WMI 1-3] WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management.[WMI 1-3] Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.[WMI 1-3] [Mandiant WMI]

An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as Execution of commands and payloads.[Mandiant WMI] For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., Inhibit System Recovery).[WMI 6]

**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by PowerShell as the primary WMI interface.[WMI 7,8] In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.[WMI 7,8]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Network Connection Creation · source-mapped

DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0082",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "initiated": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

WMI Creation · source-mapped

DC0008 collection page — For permanent subscriptions, collect Sysmon WmiEvent 19–21 and retain filter, consumer and binding information; this is not comprehensive auditing of every WMI operation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.

Required normalized fields: object_kind, namespace, object_name, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0008",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "object_kind": "event_filter",
    "namespace": "root/subscription",
    "object_name": "LabFilter",
    "action": "create"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0364 Behavioral Detection Strategy for WMI Execution Abuse on Windows

MITRE detection strategy

AN1031 Analytic 1031

Detects adversarial abuse of WMI to execute local or remote commands via WMIC, PowerShell, or COM API through a multi-event chain: process creation, command execution, and corresponding network connection if remote.

Platforms: Windows.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

47 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1047 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

94 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 12 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

WMI Execute rundll32

This test uses wmic.exe to execute a DLL function using rundll32. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 00738d2a-4651-4d76-adf2-c43a41dfb243 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • node: Ip Address (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • dll_to_execute: Path to DLL. (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\calc.dll)
  • function_to_execute: Name of DLL function to call (type string; source default StartW)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • DLL with function to execute must exist on disk at specified location (#{dll_to_execute})
WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services

An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain Remote Service is running on a remote device.
When the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists.
A common feedback message is that "No instance(s) Available" if the service queried is not running.
A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable"
if the provided remote host is unreachable

Pinned Atomic procedure · 0fd48ef7-d890-4e93-a533-f7dedd5191d3 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • node: Ip Address (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • service_search_string: Name Of Service (type string; source default Spooler)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Create a Process using obfuscated Win32_Process

This test tries to mask process creation by creating a new class that inherits from Win32_Process. Indirect call of suspicious method such as Win32_Process::Create can break detection logic. Cybereason blog post No Win32_ProcessNeeded

Pinned Atomic procedure · 10447c83-fc38-462a-a936-5102363b1c43 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • new_class: Derived class name (type string; source default Win32_Atomic)
  • process_to_execute: Name or path of process to execute. (type string; source default notepad.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

WMI Reconnaissance Processes

An adversary might use WMI to list Processes running on the compromised host.
When the test completes , there should be running processes listed on the command line.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 5750aa16-0e59-4410-8b9a-8a47ca2788e2 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • wmic.exe must be present on the system. It is disabled by default on Windows 11, version 24H2 and later, and removed when upgrading to version 25H2.
WMI Reconnaissance Software

An adversary might use WMI to list installed Software hotfix and patches.
When the test completes, there should be a list of installed patches and when they were installed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 718aebaa-d0e0-471a-8241-c5afa69c7414 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • wmic.exe must be present on the system. It is disabled by default on Windows 11, version 24H2 and later, and removed when upgrading to version 25H2.
AveMaria/Warzone program.bat WMIC Process Creation

Emulates the evasive behavior of the Ave Maria/Warzone RAT, which follows these steps:
1. Creates a batch script (program_path) that runs commands found in its own ADS named start (program_path:start)
2. Writes to program_path:start a wmiexec command that starts a process from an ADS named ApplicationData of a specified file (ads_host:ApplicationData)
3. Writes to the ADS ads_host:ApplicationData the contents of an executable (normally would be the ransomware)
4. Runs the batch script, which runs everything that was set up

Reference: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/defending-the-gates-understanding-and-detecting-ave-maria-warzone-rat.html

Pinned Atomic procedure · 778b54b0-ae7a-4f80-b74b-59eddee87ad5 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • payload_binary: Benign executable to persist (stand-in for the malware payload) (type path; source default C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe)
  • program_path: Full filepath (including filename) that the batch script is created to (type path; source default $env:TEMP\program.bat)
  • ads_host: File the Alternate Data Stream ApplicationData is attached to (type path; source default $env:TEMP\ads)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • ads_host must exist
Create a Process using WMI Query and an Encoded Command

Solarigate persistence is achieved via backdoors deployed via various techniques including using PowerShell with an EncodedCommand Powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand <encoded command> Where the –EncodedCommand, once decoded, would resemble: Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist ‘rundll32 c:\windows\idmu\common\ypprop.dll _XInitImageFuncPtrs’ -ComputerName WORKSTATION The EncodedCommand in this atomic is the following: Invoke-WmiMethod -Path win32_process -Name create -ArgumentList notepad.exe You should expect to see notepad.exe running after execution of this test. Solarigate Analysis from Microsoft

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7db7a7f9-9531-4840-9b30-46220135441c · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

WMI Execute Remote Process

This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on a remote host. Specify a valid value for remote IP using the node parameter.
To clean up, provide the same node input as the one provided to run the test
A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable" if the default or provided IP is unreachable

Pinned Atomic procedure · 9c8ef159-c666-472f-9874-90c8d60d136b · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • node: Ip Address (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • user_name: Username (type string; source default DOMAIN\Administrator)
  • password: Password (type string; source default P@ssw0rd1)
  • process_to_execute: Name or path of process to execute. (type string; source default notepad.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Impacket wmiexec.py

wmiexec.py is tool included in the Impacket toolkit that allows to execute commands remotely on a Windows System using WMI (Windows management Instrumentation).

Pinned Atomic procedure · a3ddaf15-d1a1-4bc3-8683-84c7c67120fe · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • target_domain: Domain of the Target machine. (type string; source default $env:USERDNSDOMAIN)
  • user_name: username on the target machine. (type string; source default $env:USERNAME)
  • password: password for the target machine (type string; source default 1234)
  • target_host: IP address or hostname of the target machine. (type string; source default $env:COMPUTERNAME)
  • command: Command to execute on the target machine. (type string; source default ipconfig)
  • optional_args: Additional arguments to use (like -k -no-pass) (type string; source default )
  • uv_install_dir: Directory where the uv binary is installed (type path; source default $env:TEMP\uv)
  • uv_tool_dir: Directory where uv installs tool virtualenvs (type path; source default $env:TEMP\uv\tools)
  • uv_tool_bin_dir: Directory where uv places tool executable shims (type path; source default $env:TEMP\uv\tools\bin)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • uv must be installed
  • Impacket must be installed via uv
WMI Execute Local Process

This test uses wmic.exe to execute a process on the local host.
When the test completes , a new process will be started locally .A notepad application will be started when input is left on default.

Pinned Atomic procedure · b3bdfc91-b33e-4c6d-a5c8-d64bee0276b3 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • process_to_execute: Name or path of process to execute. (type string; source default notepad.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

WMI Reconnaissance Users

An adversary might use WMI to list all local User Accounts.
When the test completes , there should be local user accounts information displayed on the command line.

Pinned Atomic procedure · c107778c-dcf5-47c5-af2e-1d058a3df3ea · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • wmic.exe must be present on the system. It is disabled by default on Windows 11, version 24H2 and later, and removed when upgrading to version 25H2.
Application uninstall using WMIC

Emulates uninstalling applications using WMIC. This method only works if the product was installed with an msi file. APTs have been seen using this to uninstall security products.

Pinned Atomic procedure · c510d25b-1667-467d-8331-a56d3e9bc4ff · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • node: Computer the action is being executed against but defaults to the localhost. (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • product: Enter the product name being uninstalled. This will default to TightVNC. (type string; source default Tightvnc)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • TightVNC must be installed.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Windows Management Instrumentation, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1018 User Account Management

    By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI.

  • M1026 Privileged Account Management

    Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. [FireEye WMI 2015]

  • M1038 Execution Prevention

    Use application control configured to block execution of <code>wmic.exe</code> if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy rules may be applied to block the <code>wmic.exe</code> application and to prevent abuse.[Microsoft WDAC]

  • M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

    On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by WMI commands from running. Note: many legitimate tools and applications utilize WMI for command execution. [win10_asr]

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprisecloud-hosted-endpointonpremWindowsexecutionisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requiredsome_candidates_require_elevation
Atomic candidate documentedtechniquesource_mapped

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

windowsautomatedcommand_promptpowershell

Detection and collection

T1047 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.