1200KM / detection
T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager: 4 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications · test · medium · {"category":"file_access","product":"windows","definition":"Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"}
- Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications · test · medium · {"category":"file_access","product":"windows","definition":"Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"}
- Suspicious Key Manager Access · test · high · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
- Windows Credential Manager Access via VaultCmd · test · medium · {"category":"process_creation","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0134 Detect Suspicious Access to Windows Credential Manager
AN0378 Analytic 0378
Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager through anomalous process execution (vaultcmd.exe, rundll32.exe keymgr.dll), suspicious API calls (CredEnumerateA), or direct file access to Credential Locker files. Correlates process creation with subsequent file reads of .vcrd/.vpol files under user Credential Locker directories.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.