1200KM / sigma-rule
Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 46612ae6-86be-4802-bc07-39b59feb1309. Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule. Detects file access requests to the the Windows Data Protection API Master keys by an uncommon application. This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::masterkey" function
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-10-17 / 2024-07-29.
{
"category": "file_access",
"product": "windows",
"definition": "Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 231e075f9e7932bd4127e0c17996434a2f442f4a2e240933d5f9d3c15e890d81
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications
id: 46612ae6-86be-4802-bc07-39b59feb1309
status: test
description: |
Detects file access requests to the the Windows Data Protection API Master keys by an uncommon application.
This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::masterkey" function
references:
- http://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/operational-guidance-for-offensive-user-dpapi-abuse/
- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
modified: 2024-07-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.004
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
selection:
FileName|contains:
- '\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\' # For System32
- '\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-' # For Users
filter_system_folders:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
# Increase level after false positives filters are good enough
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.