1200KM / sigma-rule
Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 7a2a22ea-a203-4cd3-9abf-20eb1c5c6cd2. Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule. Detects file access requests to the Windows Credential History File by an uncommon application. This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::credhist" function
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-10-17 / 2024-07-29.
{
"category": "file_access",
"product": "windows",
"definition": "Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 87c28266c819389a07559de830f501f93d0cf9e497ab7136a8dd346f8a5c15b5
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications
id: 7a2a22ea-a203-4cd3-9abf-20eb1c5c6cd2
status: test
description: |
Detects file access requests to the Windows Credential History File by an uncommon application.
This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::credhist" function
references:
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules/dpapi/credhist
- https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_dpapi_credhist
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
modified: 2024-07-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.004
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
selection:
FileName|endswith: '\Microsoft\Protect\CREDHIST'
filter_main_system_folders:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
filter_main_explorer:
Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
# Increase level after false positives filters are good enough
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.