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Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 7a2a22ea-a203-4cd3-9abf-20eb1c5c6cd2. Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications — Sigma Rule. Detects file access requests to the Windows Credential History File by an uncommon application. This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::credhist" function

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-10-17 / 2024-07-29.

{
  "category": "file_access",
  "product": "windows",
  "definition": "Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 87c28266c819389a07559de830f501f93d0cf9e497ab7136a8dd346f8a5c15b5

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Access To Windows Credential History File By Uncommon Applications
id: 7a2a22ea-a203-4cd3-9abf-20eb1c5c6cd2
status: test
description: |
    Detects file access requests to the Windows Credential History File by an uncommon application.
    This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::credhist" function
references:
    - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules/dpapi/credhist
    - https://www.passcape.com/windows_password_recovery_dpapi_credhist
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-17
modified: 2024-07-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.004
logsource:
    category: file_access
    product: windows
    definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
    selection:
        FileName|endswith: '\Microsoft\Protect\CREDHIST'
    filter_main_system_folders:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
            - 'C:\Windows\system32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
    filter_main_explorer:
        Image: 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# Increase level after false positives filters are good enough
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.