1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1110.003 Password Spraying: 0 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
DISTINCT_COUNT(account BY source_ip, 10m WHERE authentication_failed) >= threshold AND failures_per_account ALERTComparison unit: source-to-account authentication graph.
Expected behavior: a source authenticates to a small set of accounts.
Deviation: unusually high fan-out with low per-account frequency.
A high volume of authentication failures using a single password (or small set) across many different user accounts within a defined time window
Authentication failures across different accounts using a repeated or similar password via SSH or PAM stack within a short window
Multiple failed login attempts across different users using common password patterns (e.g., 'Welcome2023')
Sign-in failures across enterprise SSO applications or SaaS platforms from same IP address using the same password against multiple user identities
Authentication failure logs on routers/switches showing repeated use of default or common passwords across multiple accounts
Repeated failed authentication attempts to container APIs, control planes, or login shells across many user names using same password
Failed authentication attempts across user mailboxes using identical or common passwords (e.g., OWA brute attempts)
SaaS applications receiving authentication failures for dozens of accounts using same password or login signature
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.