1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1074 Data Staged: 2 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
MATCH(archive_or_compression_process) AND output_path IN staging_paths -> ALERT; COUNT(files_created_in_staging_path, 10m) >= threshold -> ALERTComparison unit: process-path-file sequence.
Expected behavior: archive creation occurs in known workflows and paths.
Deviation: rare process-path combination, sudden volume accumulation, or collection-to-archive transition.
Detects staging of sensitive files into temporary or public directories, compression with 7zip/WinRAR, or batch copy prior to exfiltration.
Detects script or user activity copying files to a central temp or /mnt directory followed by archive/compression utilities.
Detects files collected into user temp or shared directories followed by compression with ditto, zip, or custom scripts.
Detects virtual disk expansion or file copy operations to cloud buckets or mounted volumes from isolated instances.
Detects snapshots or data stored in VMFS volumes from root CLI or remote agents.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.