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Files With System DLL Name In Unsuspected Locations — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 13c02350-4177-4e45-ac17-cf7ca628ff5e. Files With System DLL Name In Unsuspected Locations — Sigma Rule. Detects the creation of a file with the ".dll" extension that has the name of a System DLL in uncommon or unsuspected locations. (Outisde of "System32", "SysWOW64", etc.). It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2024-06-24 / not supplied.

{
  "category": "file_event",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 7a6e900e83d5dea3c42aa1912f02d78d03c1349304240157140dc0bf76a386e5

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Files With System DLL Name In Unsuspected Locations
id: 13c02350-4177-4e45-ac17-cf7ca628ff5e
status: test
description: |
    Detects the creation of a file with the ".dll" extension that has the name of a System DLL in uncommon or unsuspected locations. (Outisde of "System32", "SysWOW64", etc.).
    It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2024-06-24
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            # Note: Add more System DLL that can be abused for DLL sideloading to increase coverage
            - '\secur32.dll'
            - '\tdh.dll'
    filter_main_generic:
        # Note: It is recommended to use a more robust filter instead of this generic one, to avoid false negatives.
        TargetFilename|contains:
            # - '\SystemRoot\System32\'
            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
            - 'C:\Windows\uus\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Third party software might bundle specific versions of system DLLs.
# Note: Upgrade to high after an initial baseline to your environement.
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_system_dll_files/info.yml

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Third party software might bundle specific versions of system DLLs.

Source references

  • Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.