1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits: 2 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
COUNT(outbound_transfers_with_similar_small_size BY source AND destination, 30m) >= threshold -> ALERTComparison unit: repeated source-destination transfers.
Expected behavior: transfer sizes and inter-arrival times vary with ordinary usage.
Deviation: persistent repeated small transfers, unusual periodicity, or changed autocorrelation.
Adversary uses a process to establish outbound connections that transmit uniform packet sizes at a consistent interval, avoiding threshold-based network alerts.
Outbound connections from non-network-facing processes repeatedly send similarly sized payloads within uniform time intervals.
Processes on macOS initiate external connections that consistently transmit data in fixed sizes using LaunchAgents or unexpected users.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.