- AN0965 · Analytic 0965 — Detection of clipboard access via OS utilities (e.g., clip.exe, Get-Clipboard) by non-interactive or abnormal parent processes, potentially chained with staging or exfiltration commands.
- AN0966 · Analytic 0966 — Detection of pbpaste/pbcopy clipboard access by processes without terminal sessions or linked to launch agents, potentially staged for collection.
- AN0967 · Analytic 0967 — Detection of xclip or xsel access to clipboard buffers outside of user terminal context, especially when chained to staging (gzip, base64) or network exfiltration (curl, scp).
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
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Clipboard Data
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. For example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using clip.exe or Get-Clipboard. Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., Transmitted Data Manipulation). macOS and Linux also have commands, such as pbpaste, to grab clipboard contents.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Module 4 — Collection Sources
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Endpoint live response and volatile acquisition
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Endpoint live response and volatile acquisition
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.