T1078 · defense-evasion, persistence, privilege-escalation, initial-access · 40 actors · 21 correlated reports

Valid Accounts

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.

Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace

Detection logic

Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.

Observed actors

Correlated CTI and IR reports

UNC1860 and the Temple of Oats: Iran's Hidden Hand in Middle Eastern Networks
Google Cloud / Mandiant · direct source mapping
IRGC-Affiliated Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption
CISA · curated primary-source mapping
Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities
CISA · curated primary-source mapping
APT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten)
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mention
ATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: MuddyWater / Seedworm (Mango Sandstorm)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: MuddyWater / Seedworm (Mango Sandstorm)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
Defensive CTI Research on Threats to Israeli Government and Public-Sector Environments
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mention
Executive Summary
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mention
Pioneer Kitten (Fox Kitten, Lemon Sandstorm, UNC757) – Actor Deep Research
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mention
ATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mention
CTI Research Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
1200km Medium · authored report mention
CTI Research Kubernetes Cloud Native Threat Landscape
1200km Medium · authored report mention
CTI Research MuddyWater Seedworm Mango Sandstorm
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Correlation Based Detection Rules in Cybersecurity From Atomic Events to Behavioral Insight
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Cyberattacks on 4G LTE Telecom Networks Threat Mapping and Defense
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Manual CTI vs AI Assisted CTI A Step by Step Clock Comparison
1200km Medium · authored report mention

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