Valid Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.
Observed actors
G0119GALLIUM
G0093Volt Typhoon
G1017APT41
G0096Dragonfly
G0035menuPass
G0045FIN6
G0037FIN7
G0046Sandworm Team
G0034APT18
G0026APT39
G0087Akira
G1024OilRig
G0049Carbanak
G0008Suckfly
G0039POLONIUM
G1005Ke3chang
G0004Leviathan
G0065FIN5
G0053APT29
G0016Cinnamon Tempest
G1021Chimera
G0114Silent Librarian
G0122TEMP.Veles
G0088Star Blizzard
G1033Axiom
G0001APT28
G0007Fox Kitten
G0117Lazarus Group
G0032INC Ransom
G1032FIN4
G0085Silence
G0091LAPSUS$
G1004Wizard Spider
G0102Play
G1040Threat Group-3390
G0027APT33
G0064FIN10
G0051FIN8
G0061PittyTiger
G0011
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Google Cloud / Mandiant · direct source mappingIRGC-Affiliated Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption
CISA · curated primary-source mappingIranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities
CISA · curated primary-source mappingAPT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten)
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: MuddyWater / Seedworm (Mango Sandstorm)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: MuddyWater / Seedworm (Mango Sandstorm)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionDefensive CTI Research on Threats to Israeli Government and Public-Sector Environments
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionExecutive Summary
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionPioneer Kitten (Fox Kitten, Lemon Sandstorm, UNC757) – Actor Deep Research
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Kubernetes Cloud Native Threat Landscape
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research MuddyWater Seedworm Mango Sandstorm
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCorrelation Based Detection Rules in Cybersecurity From Atomic Events to Behavioral Insight
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCyberattacks on 4G LTE Telecom Networks Threat Mapping and Defense
1200km Medium · authored report mentionManual CTI vs AI Assisted CTI A Step by Step Clock Comparison
1200km Medium · authored report mention