1200KM / telemetry
User Account Metadata — Detection Telemetry
Account inventory and attributes at a point in time.
Collection and providers
Export an authorized directory/account inventory with stable IDs, roles, enabled state and collection time; compare snapshots without exposing credentials.
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
Configuration
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0013",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account_id": "user-lab-1",
"enabled": true,
"roles": [
"lab-reader"
],
"inventory_time": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z"
}
}Visibility and validation
Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1003.001 · LSASS Memory · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1036.010 · Masquerade Account Name · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1087 · Account Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1087.001 · Local Account · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1087.003 · Email Account · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1087.004 · Cloud Account · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1134.005 · SID-History Injection · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1185 · Browser Session Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1189 · Drive-by Compromise · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1201 · Password Policy Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1496.004 · Cloud Service Hijacking · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1526 · Cloud Service Discovery · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1530 · Data from Cloud Storage · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1535 · Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1548.005 · Temporary Elevated Cloud Access · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1550 · Use Alternate Authentication Material · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1561 · Disk Wipe · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1561.001 · Disk Content Wipe · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1561.002 · Disk Structure Wipe · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1564.002 · Hidden Users · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
- AADInternals · S0677
- BloodHound · S0521
- cipher.exe · S1205
- Cobalt Strike · S0154
- CrackMapExec · S0488
- Diskpart · S9002
- Empire · S0363
- evilginx2 · S9003
- Impacket · S0357
- LaZagne · S0349
- Lslsass · S0121
- MailSniper · S0413
- Mimikatz · S0002
- Net · S0039
- Pacu · S1091
- Peirates · S0683
- PoshC2 · S0378
- PowerSploit · S0194
- Pupy · S0192
- RawDisk · S0364
- ROADTools · S0684
- Ruler · S0358
- ShimRatReporter · S0445
- SILENTTRINITY · S0692
- Sliver · S0633
- TruffleHog · S9009
- Windows Credential Editor · S0005
Connected anomaly research
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.