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T1201 Password Policy Discovery — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).

Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code> [Superuser Linux Password Policies] [Jamf User Password Policies]. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. <code>show aaa</code>, <code>show aaa common-criteria policy all</code>).[US-CERT-TA18-106A]

Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS [AWS GetPasswordPolicy].

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Active Directory Object Access · source-mapped

DC0071 collection page — Enable Audit Directory Service Access and scoped object SACLs; interpret access masks and property GUIDs in their directory context.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: object_dn, access, actor.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0071",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "object_dn": "CN=LabUser,OU=Lab,DC=example,DC=test",
    "access": "read_property",
    "actor": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Command Execution · source-mapped

DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
  • Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
  • On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0064",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "interpreter": "/bin/sh",
    "command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
    "actor_uid": 1000,
    "session_id": "lab-session-1"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

User Account Metadata · source-mapped

DC0013 collection page — Export an authorized directory/account inventory with stable IDs, roles, enabled state and collection time; compare snapshots without exposing credentials.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: account_id, enabled, roles, inventory_time.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0013",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account_id": "user-lab-1",
    "enabled": true,
    "roles": [
      "lab-reader"
    ],
    "inventory_time": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0161 Password Policy Discovery – cross-platform behavior-chain analytics

MITRE detection strategy

AN0455 Analytic 0455

Cause→effect chain: (1) a user or service spawns a shell/PowerShell that queries local/domain password policy via commands/cmdlets (e.g., `net accounts`, `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy`, `secedit /export`); (2) optional directory/LDAP reads from DCs; (3) same principal performs adjacent Discovery or credential-related actions within a short window. Correlate sysmon process creation with PowerShell ScriptBlock and Security logs.

Platforms: Windows.

AN0456 Analytic 0456

Chain: (1) interactive/non-interactive `chage -l`, `grep`/`cat` of PAM config (e.g., `/etc/pam.d/common-password`, `/etc/security/pwquality.conf`); (2) optional reads of `/etc/login.defs`; (3) same user performs account enumeration or password change attempts shortly after. Use auditd `execve` and file read events plus shell history collection.

Platforms: Linux.

AN0457 Analytic 0457

Chain: (1) execution of `pwpolicy` or MDM/DirectoryService reads of account policies; (2) optional read of `/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow` or config profiles; (3) follow-on credential probing or lateral movement by same user/session. Use unified logs and process telemetry.

Platforms: macOS.

AN0458 Analytic 0458

Chain: (1) cloud API calls that fetch tenant/organization password policy (e.g., AWS `GetAccountPasswordPolicy`, GCP/OCI equivalents or IAM settings reads); (2) within a short window, the same principal creates users, rotates creds, or changes auth settings. Use cloud audit logs.

Platforms: IaaS.

AN0459 Analytic 0459

Chain: (1) IdP policy/read operations by a principal (e.g., Microsoft Entra/Graph requests to read password or authentication policies); (2) adjacent risky changes (role assignment, app consent) by same principal. Use IdP audit logs.

Platforms: Identity Provider.

  • User Account Metadata — azure:audit; channel operation contains 'Get*Password*Policy' OR 'List*Authentication*Policy' OR 'Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy'.

AN0460 Analytic 0460

Chain: (1) SaaS admin API or PowerShell remote session reads tenant password/authentication settings (e.g., M365 Unified Audit Log ‘Cmdlet’ with `Get-MsolPasswordPolicy`/`Get-OrganizationConfig` parameters that expose password settings); (2) same session proceeds to mailbox or tenant changes.

Platforms: SaaS.

  • User Account Metadata — m365:unified; channel Workload=AzureActiveDirectory OR Exchange AND (Operation=Cmdlet AND Parameters contains 'Password' AND (CmdletName='Get-*' OR CmdletName='Get-OrganizationConfig')).

AN0461 Analytic 0461

Chain: (1) privileged CLI sessions run read-only commands that dump AAA/password policies (e.g., `show aaa`, `show password-policy`); (2) same account changes AAA or user DB shortly after. Use network device AAA/command accounting or syslog.

Platforms: Network Devices.

  • Command Execution — networkdevice:syslog; channel cmd='show aaa*' OR 'show running-config | include password|aaa' OR 'show aaa common-criteria policy all'.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

5 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1201 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  • Script and command execution: Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Host state and inventory: Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

4 source-documented software associations
  • S0039 Net — tool.

    The <code>net accounts</code> and <code>net accounts /domain</code> commands with Net can be used to obtain password policy information.[Savill 1999]

    Exact relationship: relationship--0224ebf5-13ef-4fb0-b9e7-53ea58c15a4d
  • S0236 Kwampirs — malware.

    Kwampirs collects password policy information with the command <code>net accounts</code>.[Symantec Orangeworm April 2018]

    Exact relationship: relationship--ddda59d4-5455-4d42-901b-b7a227a8a023
  • S0378 PoshC2 — tool.

    PoshC2 can use <code>Get-PassPol</code> to enumerate the domain password policy.[GitHub PoshC2]

    Exact relationship: relationship--fd074370-f9d4-43a1-bf1f-0afdb46ab28b
  • S0488 CrackMapExec — tool.

    CrackMapExec can discover the password policies applied to the target system.[CME Github September 2018]

    Exact relationship: relationship--11ca4266-5fca-4be4-9bce-275c655c66bd

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 12 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu

Lists the password complexity policy to console on Ubuntu Linux.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 085fe567-ac84-47c7-ac4c-2688ce28265b · linux · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine AWS Password Policy

This atomic test will display details about the password policy for the current AWS account.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 15330820-d405-450b-bd08-16b5be5be9f4 · iaas:aws · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured
Get-DomainPolicy with PowerView

Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainPolicy to return the default domain policy or the domain controller policy for the current domain or a specified domain/domain controller.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 3177f4da-3d4b-4592-8bdc-aa23d0b2e843 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine local password policy - Windows

Lists the local password policy to console on Windows.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 4588d243-f24e-4549-b2e3-e627acc089f6 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine domain password policy - Windows

Lists the domain password policy to console on Windows.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 46c2c362-2679-4ef5-aec9-0e958e135be4 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine password policy - macOS

Lists the password policy to console on macOS.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 4b7fa042-9482-45e1-b348-4b756b2a0742 · macos · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Use of SecEdit.exe to export the local security policy (including the password policy)

SecEdit.exe can be used to export the current local security policy applied to a host. Reference

Pinned Atomic procedure · 510cc97f-56ac-4cd3-a198-d3218c23d889 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 6.x

Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL 6.x Linux.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 6ce12552-0adb-4f56-89ff-95ce268f6358 · linux · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • System must be CentOS or RHEL v6
Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 7.x

Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL 7.x Linux.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 78a12e65-efff-4617-bc01-88f17d71315d · linux · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • System must be CentOS or RHEL v7
Examine password expiration policy - All Linux

Lists the password expiration policy to console on CentOS/RHEL/Ubuntu.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7c86c55c-70fa-4a05-83c9-3aa19b145d1a · linux · bash.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Examine password complexity policy - FreeBSD

Lists the password complexity policy to console on FreeBSD.

Pinned Atomic procedure · a7893624-a3d7-4aed-9676-80498f31820f · linux · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Enumerate Active Directory Password Policy with get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy

The following Atomic test will utilize get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy to enumerate domain password policy.
Upon successful execution a listing of the policy implemented will display.
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2022-ps

Pinned Atomic procedure · b2698b33-984c-4a1c-93bb-e4ba72a0babb · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1201 Password Policy Discovery; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Password Policy Discovery, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1027 Password Policies

    Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (<code>C:\Windows\System32\</code> by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages</code>. [Microsoft Install Password Filter n.d]

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1201 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.