1200KM / telemetry
Firmware Modification — Detection Telemetry
Changes to firmware state or a firmware update observation on a device.
Collection and providers
Collect approved OEM firmware inventory/update audit and compare version or measured hashes against a known baseline. Use read-only vendor-supported interfaces.
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
Configuration
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0004",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"asset_id": "lab-device-1",
"firmware_before": "1.0-lab",
"firmware_after": "1.1-lab",
"change_ticket": "LAB-42"
}
}Visibility and validation
Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1056.001 · Keylogging · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1090.003 · Multi-hop Proxy · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1495 · Firmware Corruption · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1542 · Pre-OS Boot · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1542.001 · System Firmware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1542.002 · Component Firmware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1542.004 · ROMMONkit · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1542.005 · TFTP Boot · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1564.005 · Hidden File System · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1601.001 · Patch System Image · Detection rules & anomalies
- T0851 · Rootkit · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1693 · Modify Firmware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1693.001 · System Firmware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1693.002 · Module Firmware · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.