1200KM / simulation
T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious…
Technique description
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Tor Proxy Usage - MacOS
Procedure 12631354-fdbc-4164-92be-402527e748da; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Psiphon
Procedure 14d55ca0-920e-4b44-8425-37eedd72b173; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Tor Proxy Usage - Debian/Ubuntu/FreeBSD
Procedure 5ff9d047-6e9c-4357-b39b-5cf89d9b59c7; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Tor Proxy Usage - Windows
Procedure 7b9d85e5-c4ce-4434-8060-d3de83595e69; elevation not declared required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.