1200KM / detection
T0874 Hooking — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T0874 Hooking: 0 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0722 Detection of Hooking
AN1855 Analytic 1855
Real-time monitoring identifies an unsigned or unexpected process calling Windows hooking Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) (SetWindowsHookEx, SetWinEventHook) targeting an Industrial Control System (ICS) engineering or Human-Machine Interface (HMI) process, immediately followed by that target process loading a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) not present in the vendor's signed module baseline. Confirmed in the wild: Stuxnet replaced Siemens' s7otbxdx.dll on engineering workstations to intercept and falsify Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) read/write calls between WinCC/STEP7 and the controller. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
AN2110 Analytic 2110
Real-time monitoring identifies a process setting LD_PRELOAD before launching an Industrial Control System (ICS) service binary, or writing to /etc/ld.so.preload, where the injected library path is not part of the vendor's package manifest. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
AN2243 Analytic 2243
Detect embedded hooking by correlating an independently acquired firmware/module integrity measurement that differs from the approved vendor/baseline image with protocol-response behavior that also departs from the device's known deterministic behavior. A protocol-response anomaly by itself does not prove a hook because firmware versions, device state, communications faults, and vendor-specific behavior can produce response differences. Treat network anomalies as corroboration and require independent integrity evidence or vendor/device attestation before escalating the condition as firmware-level hooking. Monitoring mode: periodic or event-triggered integrity verification plus near-real-time protocol monitoring where a capable OT protocol decoder is deployed.
AN2286 Analytic 2286
Real-time monitoring identifies ICS protocol responses whose timing or payload structure deviates from the established device-specific per-function baseline in a pattern consistent with an intercepting relay or hook. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
- File Modification · DC0061
- Firmware Modification · DC0004
- Module Load · DC0016
- Network Traffic Content · DC0085
- Process Metadata · DC0034
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Existing anomaly research
Complete technique engineering workbook
Collection configuration and event examples · Anomaly models and design worksheet · Tools and documented software · Simulation procedures · Offline synthetic collection check
Exact source tags are not semantic relevance verdicts. Review actual rule conditions and observation points; imported rules are not backend-compiled or live-validated.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.