1200KM / simulation
T1409 Stored Application Data — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail. Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: * An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions…
Technique description
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail. Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: * An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions…
No compatible procedure was found in the pinned Atomic index. This is a support gap, not a finding of technical impossibility.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
No compatible documented candidate in the pinned snapshot. This is a support gap, not technical impossibility.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.