{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"mobile/T1409","id":"T1409","name":"Stored Application Data","domain":"mobile","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409","source_file":{"file":"mobile.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/mobile-attack/mobile-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5","bytes":6095145},"source_object_sha256":"b17f38999bf50328d6592fbb5818ea6632381b1145ada78d379b27c2b0e62193","description":"Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) \n\n \n\nDue to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: \n\n \n\n* An application stores files in unprotected external storage \n* An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) \n* The adversary gains root permissions on the device ","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409","external_id":"T1409"},{"source_name":"SWB Exodus March 2019","description":"Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200314194610/https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html"},{"source_name":"NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue","url":"https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/authentication-threats/AUT-0.html","external_id":"AUT-0"}],"platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Declared or granted permissions of a mobile application.","collection_focus":"Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Inspect the owned Android lab application","language":"shell","source_id":"android_state","content":"adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab","note":"Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream."},"required_fields":["package","permission","declared","granted"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Mobile lab instrumentation","description":"Application state and lifecycle observations such as foreground/background transitions.","collection_focus":"Instrument the owned app lifecycle and corroborate permitted service snapshots; distinguish app events from inferred gateway activity.","providers":[{"name":"Android logcat","scope":"Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.","source_id":"android_logs"},{"name":"Android dumpsys","scope":"Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.","source_id":"android_state"},{"name":"Instrumented test application","scope":"Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.","source_id":"android_permissions"}],"configuration":["Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.","Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.","Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["package","state_before","state_after","source"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.","sources":[{"id":"android_logs","title":"Android logcat and access limits","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/logcat"},{"id":"android_state","title":"Android dumpsys","url":"https://developer.android.com/tools/dumpsys"},{"id":"android_permissions","title":"Android runtime permission requests","url":"https://developer.android.com/training/permissions/requesting"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability."},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Windows and directory audit","description":"Access to file objects with user, process and access-right context.","collection_focus":"Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.","providers":[{"name":"Windows Security auditing","scope":"Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.","source_id":"audit"}],"configuration":["Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.","For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.","Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["path","access","actor","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.","sources":[{"id":"audit","title":"Microsoft advanced security audit policy","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-audit-policy-settings"},{"id":"ad","title":"Microsoft Audit Directory Service Changes","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-directory-service-changes"},{"id":"task","title":"Microsoft scheduled-task creation event 4698","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4698"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance."},{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Host state and inventory","description":"Host health and availability observations such as heartbeat, shutdown or degraded state.","collection_focus":"Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.","providers":[{"name":"osquery","scope":"Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.","source_id":"osquery"},{"name":"Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots","scope":"Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.","source_id":"linux"}],"configuration":["Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.","Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.","Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["asset_id","status","heartbeat_age_seconds","collector_healthy"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.","sources":[{"id":"osquery","title":"osquery scheduled configuration","url":"https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/docs/wiki/deployment/configuration.md"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion."},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Connection/flow summaries such as endpoints, duration, byte counts and transport.","collection_focus":"Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"},{"name":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","scope":"IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.","source_id":"flow"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["source_ip","destination_ip","destination_port","protocol","bytes_sent","bytes_received"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"},{"id":"flow","title":"AWS VPC Flow Logs","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/flow-logs.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."}],"detection":{"key":"mobile/T1409","id":"T1409","name":"Stored Application Data","domain":"mobile","platforms":["Android","iOS"],"environments":["mobile"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409","technique_page":"techniques/mobile/T1409/","page":"detections/mobile/T1409/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":2,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0621","name":"Detection of Stored Application Data","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--d87dc800-38cb-4d82-b76e-3c501dbd9c0a","relationship_id":"relationship--a501ed56-2ae3-4dde-99db-a00ced43c05a","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1683","name":"Analytic 1683","guidance":"For Android, detect Stored Application Data by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; File Access via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: open() for read on path IN /sdcard/ OR on path with file_permissions=777]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1683","platforms":["Android"],"tuning":[{"field":"HighValueAppList","description":"Banking, email, authenticator, messaging app packages. Derive from MDM app catalog by data-sensitivity tier."},{"field":"ApprovedStorageReaders","description":"Media players, file managers, MDM agent. Derive from MDM catalog."},{"field":"UplinkThreshold","description":"Default 500KB. Tightening: 100KB. Derive from per-app upload baseline."},{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-app known upload destinations. Derive by measurement."},{"field":"ExfilWindow","description":"Default 120s."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0114","component":"Application Permission","name":"android:DevicePolicyManager","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1683","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1683","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0114/"},{"component_id":"DC0055","component":"File Access","name":"mobile:ForensicArtifacts","channel":"Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: open() for read on path IN /sdcard/ OR on path with file_permissions=777","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1683","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1683","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0055/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"android:EnterpriseNetworkLog","channel":"DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata","platforms":["Android"],"analytic_id":"AN1683","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1683","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]},{"id":"AN1684","name":"Analytic 1684","guidance":"For iOS, detect Stored Application Data by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; Host Status via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1684","platforms":["iOS"],"tuning":[{"field":"HighValueAppList","description":"Banking, authentication, enterprise email, cryptocurrency wallet bundle IDs. Derive from MDM app catalog by data-sensitivity tier."},{"field":"DataDumpMin","description":"Default 50KB — minimum for meaningful app database content."},{"field":"DataDumpMax","description":"Default 10MB — cap to exclude media exfil which is larger."},{"field":"AppCDNList","description":"Per-device CDN baseline, 30-day."},{"field":"ExfilWindow","description":"Default 300s after jailbreak detection."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0123","component":"Application State","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1684","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1684","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0123/"},{"component_id":"DC0018","component":"Host Status","name":"iOS:MDM","channel":"DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1684","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1684","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0018/"},{"component_id":"DC0078","component":"Network Traffic Flow","name":"iOS:NetworkExtension","channel":"NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata","platforms":["iOS"],"analytic_id":"AN1684","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0621#AN1684","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0078/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0114","name":"Application Permission","tag":"Application Permission","page":"telemetry/DC0114/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0123","name":"Application State","tag":"Application State","page":"telemetry/DC0123/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0055","name":"File Access","tag":"File Access","page":"telemetry/DC0055/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0018","name":"Host Status","tag":"Host Status","page":"telemetry/DC0018/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0078","name":"Network Traffic Flow","tag":"Network Traffic Flow","page":"telemetry/DC0078/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","page":"tools/S0408/","kind":"attack_tool","bases":["attack_uses"],"guides":[]}],"software":[{"id":"S0289","name":"Pegasus for iOS","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289","kind":"malware","description":"[Pegasus for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289) accesses sensitive data in files, such as saving Skype calls by reading them out of the Skype database files.(Citation: Lookout-Pegasus)","relationship_id":"relationship--a290a8ca-e650-456c-b33e-03343fe5ea4e","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-Pegasus","description":"Lookout. (2016). Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-pegasus-technical-analysis.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0295","name":"RCSAndroid","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295","kind":"malware","description":"[RCSAndroid](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0295) can collect contacts and messages from popular applications, including Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, Skype, Viber, Line, WeChat, Hangouts, Telegram, and BlackBerry Messenger.(Citation: TrendMicro-RCSAndroid)","relationship_id":"relationship--4088b31b-d542-4935-84b4-82b592159591","references":[{"source_name":"TrendMicro-RCSAndroid","description":"Veo Zhang. (2015, July 21). Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In. Retrieved December 22, 2016.","url":"http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/hacking-team-rcsandroid-spying-tool-listens-to-calls-roots-devices-to-get-in/"}]},{"id":"S0311","name":"YiSpecter","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311","kind":"malware","description":"[YiSpecter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0311) has modified Safari’s default search engine, bookmarked websites, opened pages, and accessed contacts and authorization tokens of the IM program “QQ” on infected devices.(Citation: paloalto_yispecter_1015)","relationship_id":"relationship--8c50e9e7-e13c-4814-98d0-088d73b10005","references":[{"source_name":"paloalto_yispecter_1015","description":"Claud Xiao. (2015, October 4). YiSpecter: First iOS Malware That Attacks Non-jailbroken Apple iOS Devices by Abusing Private APIs. Retrieved March 3, 2023.","url":"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/yispecter-first-ios-malware-attacks-non-jailbroken-ios-devices-by-abusing-private-apis/"}]},{"id":"S0316","name":"Pegasus for Android","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316","kind":"malware","description":"[Pegasus for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316) accesses sensitive data in files, such as messages stored by the WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter applications. It also has the ability to access arbitrary filenames and retrieve directory listings.(Citation: Lookout-PegasusAndroid)","relationship_id":"relationship--3f973c3c-45f8-432a-9859-e8749f2e7418","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-PegasusAndroid","description":"Mike Murray. (2017, April 3). Pegasus for Android: the other side of the story emerges. Retrieved April 16, 2017.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/04/03/pegasus-android/"}]},{"id":"S0324","name":"SpyDealer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324","kind":"malware","description":"[SpyDealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0324) exfiltrates data from over 40 apps such as WeChat, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, and others.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)","relationship_id":"relationship--bd351b17-e995-4528-bbea-e1138c51476a","references":[{"source_name":"PaloAlto-SpyDealer","description":"Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.","url":"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/unit42-spydealer-android-trojan-spying-40-apps/"}]},{"id":"S0327","name":"Skygofree","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327","kind":"malware","description":"[Skygofree](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0327) has a capability to obtain files from other installed applications.(Citation: Kaspersky-Skygofree)","relationship_id":"relationship--c374c9ce-ff30-4daa-bdec-8015a507746a","references":[{"source_name":"Kaspersky-Skygofree","description":"Nikita Buchka and Alexey Firsh. (2018, January 16). Skygofree: Following in the footsteps of HackingTeam. Retrieved September 24, 2018.","url":"https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/"}]},{"id":"S0329","name":"Tangelo","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329","kind":"malware","description":"[Tangelo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0329) accesses databases from WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, and Line.(Citation: Lookout-StealthMango)","relationship_id":"relationship--92129d5b-7822-4e84-8a69-f96b598fba9e","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout-StealthMango","description":"Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/lookout-stealth-mango-srr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0399","name":"Pallas","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399","kind":"malware","description":"[Pallas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399) retrieves messages and decryption keys for popular messaging applications and other accounts stored on the device.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)","relationship_id":"relationship--04530307-22d8-4a06-9056-55eea225fabb","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018","description":"Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.","url":"https://info.lookout.com/rs/051-ESQ-475/images/Lookout_Dark-Caracal_srr_20180118_us_v.1.0.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0405","name":"Exodus","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0405","kind":"malware","description":"[Exodus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0405) Two extracts information from Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Gmail, IMO, Skype, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp, and WeChat.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)","relationship_id":"relationship--1ed5b4fa-b871-4efa-87ee-1c91dcaa421e","references":[{"source_name":"SWB Exodus March 2019","description":"Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.","url":"https://web.archive.org/web/20200314194610/https://securitywithoutborders.org/blog/2019/03/29/exodus.html"}]},{"id":"S0408","name":"FlexiSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408","kind":"tool","description":"[FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) uses a `FileObserver` object to monitor the Skype and WeChat database file and shared preferences to retrieve chat messages, account information, and profile pictures of the account owner and chat participants. [FlexiSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0408) can also spy on popular applications, including Facebook, Hangouts, Hike, Instagram, Kik, Line, QQ, Snapchat, Telegram, Tinder, Viber, and WhatsApp.(Citation: FortiGuard-FlexiSpy)","relationship_id":"relationship--32be51e2-f74d-441f-aa0d-952697a76494","references":[{"source_name":"FortiGuard-FlexiSpy","description":"K. Lu. (n.d.). Deep Technical Analysis of the Spyware FlexiSpy for Android. Retrieved September 10, 2019.","url":"https://d3gpjj9d20n0p3.cloudfront.net/fortiguard/research/Dig%20Deep%20into%20FlexiSpy%20for%20Android%28white%20paper%29_KaiLu.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0485","name":"Mandrake","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485","kind":"malware","description":"[Mandrake](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0485) can collect all accounts stored on the device.(Citation: Bitdefender Mandrake)","relationship_id":"relationship--27b8153c-130e-44a7-84a9-840f4c23e2ea","references":[{"source_name":"Bitdefender Mandrake","description":"R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/329/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-Mandrake-creat4464-en-EN-interactive.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0505","name":"Desert Scorpion","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505","kind":"malware","description":"[Desert Scorpion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0505) can collect account information stored on the device.(Citation: Lookout Desert Scorpion)","relationship_id":"relationship--972f0703-f4d7-42d2-8ca2-bec175dac0bf","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Desert Scorpion","description":"A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/desert-scorpion-google-play"}]},{"id":"S0509","name":"FakeSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0509","kind":"malware","description":"[FakeSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0509) can collect account information stored on the device, as well as data in external storage.(Citation: Cybereason FakeSpy)","relationship_id":"relationship--142532a6-bf7c-4b25-be23-16f01160f3c5","references":[{"source_name":"Cybereason FakeSpy","description":"O. Almkias. (2020, July 1). FakeSpy Masquerades as Postal Service Apps Around the World. Retrieved September 15, 2020.","url":"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/fakespy-masquerades-as-postal-service-apps-around-the-world"}]},{"id":"S0529","name":"CarbonSteal","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529","kind":"malware","description":"[CarbonSteal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0529) can collect notes and data from the MiCode app.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--d5928f73-c4ba-4eb1-bf8a-e75ff6806a4a","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0550","name":"DoubleAgent","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550","kind":"malware","description":"[DoubleAgent](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0550) has accessed browser history, as well as the files for 15 other apps.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--d4154247-90ce-43b9-8c17-5c28f67617f5","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0551","name":"GoldenEagle","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551","kind":"malware","description":"[GoldenEagle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0551) has extracted messages from chat programs, such as WeChat.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)","relationship_id":"relationship--e269e6a2-a709-4aa1-a260-f3f0d0284056","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout Uyghur Campaign","description":"A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/documents/threat-reports/us/lookout-uyghur-malware-tr-us.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0577","name":"FrozenCell","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577","kind":"malware","description":"[FrozenCell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0577) has retrieved account information for other applications.(Citation: Lookout FrozenCell)","relationship_id":"relationship--bce64ec2-43d5-4501-a0aa-0abe65551a19","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout FrozenCell","description":"Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020.","url":"https://blog.lookout.com/frozencell-mobile-threat"}]},{"id":"S0655","name":"BusyGasper","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655","kind":"malware","description":"[BusyGasper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0655) can collect data from messaging applications, including WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook.(Citation: SecureList BusyGasper)","relationship_id":"relationship--fcc42341-ec3a-4e24-a374-46bed72d061f","references":[{"source_name":"SecureList BusyGasper","description":"Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021.","url":"https://securelist.com/busygasper-the-unfriendly-spy/87627/"}]},{"id":"S1062","name":"S.O.V.A.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062","kind":"malware","description":"[S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062) can gather session cookies from infected devices. [S.O.V.A.](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1062) can also abuse Accessibility Services to steal Google Authenticator tokens.(Citation: threatfabric_sova_0921)(Citation: cleafy_sova_1122)","relationship_id":"relationship--3364dd33-c012-4aaf-852b-86e63bd724ac","references":[{"source_name":"cleafy_sova_1122","description":"Francesco Lubatti, Federico Valentini. (2022, November 8). SOVA malware is back and is evolving rapidly. Retrieved March 30, 2023.","url":"https://www.cleafy.com/cleafy-labs/sova-malware-is-back-and-is-evolving-rapidly"},{"source_name":"threatfabric_sova_0921","description":"ThreatFabric. (2021, September 9). S.O.V.A. - A new Android Banking trojan with fowl intentions. Retrieved February 6, 2023.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/sova-new-trojan-with-fowl-intentions.html"}]},{"id":"S1067","name":"FluBot","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1067","kind":"malware","description":"[FluBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1067) has collected credentials, banking details and other information from the victim device.(Citation: Europol FluBot Jun2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--501c3f2a-1ae0-4832-9730-3fdf5f31df5c","references":[{"source_name":"Europol FluBot Jun2022","description":"Europol. (2022, June 1). Takedown of SMS-based FluBot spyware infecting Android phones. Retrieved April 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/takedown-of-sms-based-flubot-spyware-infecting-android-phones"}]},{"id":"S1077","name":"Hornbill","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077","kind":"malware","description":"[Hornbill](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1077) can collect voice notes and messages from WhatsApp, if installed.(Citation: lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221)","relationship_id":"relationship--8f4c7030-f3e2-4c7d-b5b1-dc6815055c68","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221","description":"Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-novel-confucius-apt-android-spyware-linked-to-india-pakistan-conflict"}]},{"id":"S1079","name":"BOULDSPY","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079","kind":"malware","description":"[BOULDSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1079) can retrieve account information for third party services, such as Google, Telegram, WeChat, or WhatsApp.(Citation: lookout_bouldspy_0423)","relationship_id":"relationship--088c74f5-4b43-48aa-a2be-275f0c02ffc8","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_bouldspy_0423","description":"Kyle Schmittle, Alemdar Islamoglu, Paul Shunk, Justin Albrecht. (2023, April 27). Lookout Discovers Android Spyware Tied to Iranian Police Targeting Minorities: BouldSpy. Retrieved July 21, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/iranian-spyware-bouldspy"}]},{"id":"S1082","name":"Sunbird","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082","kind":"malware","description":"[Sunbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1082) can exfiltrate browser history, BlackBerry Messenger files, IMO instant messaging content, and WhatsApp voice notes.(Citation: lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221)","relationship_id":"relationship--9819974c-f093-482b-8b2b-93a05ab7382e","references":[{"source_name":"lookout_hornbill_sunbird_0221","description":"Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/blog/lookout-discovers-novel-confucius-apt-android-spyware-linked-to-india-pakistan-conflict"}]},{"id":"S1092","name":"Escobar","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092","kind":"malware","description":"[Escobar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1092) can request the `GET_ACCOUNTS` permission to get the list of accounts on the device, and can collect media files.(Citation: Bleeipng Computer Escobar)","relationship_id":"relationship--ba116807-ef1c-4621-84c8-9921fa7b735e","references":[{"source_name":"Bleeipng Computer Escobar","description":"B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/android-malware-escobar-steals-your-google-authenticator-mfa-codes/"}]},{"id":"S1093","name":"FlyTrap","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1093","kind":"malware","description":"[FlyTrap](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1093) can collect Facebook account information, such as Facebook ID, email address, cookies, and login tokens.(Citation: Trend Micro FlyTrap)(Citation: Zimperium FlyTrap)","relationship_id":"relationship--812490b8-2160-47e9-9e1e-c1749b7ee86d","references":[{"source_name":"Zimperium FlyTrap","description":"A. Yaswant. (2021, August 9). FlyTrap Android Malware Compromises Thousands of Facebook Accounts. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://www.zimperium.com/blog/flytrap-android-malware-compromises-thousands-of-facebook-accounts/"},{"source_name":"Trend Micro FlyTrap","description":"Trend Micro. (2021, August 17). FlyTrap Android Malware Is Taking Over Facebook Accounts — Protect Yourself With a Malware Scanner. Retrieved September 28, 2023.","url":"https://news.trendmicro.com/2021/08/17/flytrap-android-malware-is-taking-over-facebook-accounts-protect-yourself-with-a-malware-scanner/"}]},{"id":"S1103","name":"FlixOnline","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1103","kind":"malware","description":"[FlixOnline](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1103) can steal data from a user’s WhatsApp account(s).(Citation: checkpoint_flixonline_0421)","relationship_id":"relationship--98360714-5239-442f-9619-d562b4b7ce76","references":[{"source_name":"checkpoint_flixonline_0421","description":"Aviran Hazum, Bodgan Melnykov, Israel Wenik. (2021, April 7). New Wormable Android Malware Spreads by Creating Auto-Replies to Messages in WhatsApp. Retrieved January 26, 2024.","url":"https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/new-wormable-android-malware-spreads-by-creating-auto-replies-to-messages-in-whatsapp/"}]},{"id":"S1128","name":"HilalRAT","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1128","kind":"malware","description":"[HilalRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1128) can access and retrieve files on a device.(Citation: Meta Adversarial Threat Report 2022)","relationship_id":"relationship--6859be95-c11a-4085-b8d3-c4ea4e2add44","references":[{"source_name":"Meta Adversarial Threat Report 2022","description":"Agranovich, D., et al. (2022, April). Adversarial Threat Report. Retrieved April 2, 2024.","url":"https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Meta-Quarterly-Adversarial-Threat-Report_Q1-2022.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1185","name":"LightSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185","kind":"malware","description":"[LightSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1185) has collected payment history from WeChat Pay.(Citation: MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024)(Citation: Threatfabric LightSpy 2023)(Citation: LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025)","relationship_id":"relationship--56816b86-3c80-429b-8360-7b4e77538c97","references":[{"source_name":"LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025","description":"Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.","url":"https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/coordinated-kill-switch-lightspys-ios-destructive-plugin-bestuzhev-zhoye/"},{"source_name":"MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024","description":"Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.","url":"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2024/04/lightspy-returns-renewed-espionage-campaign-targets-southern-asia-possibly-india"},{"source_name":"Threatfabric LightSpy 2023","description":"ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025.","url":"https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/lightspy-mapt-mobile-payment-system-attack"}]},{"id":"S1243","name":"DCHSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243","kind":"malware","description":"[DCHSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1243) has collected files of interest on the device, including WhatsApp files.(Citation: Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025) ","relationship_id":"relationship--ad1cd55e-10a7-4895-bc76-160e2de319cf","references":[{"source_name":"Lookout_DCHSpy_July2025","description":"Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025.","url":"https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/lookout-discovers-iranian-dchsy-surveillanceware"}]},{"id":"S9006","name":"VajraSpy","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006","kind":"malware","description":"[VajraSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9006) has collected messages in WhatsApp, WhatsApp Business, and Signal.(Citation: ESET_VajraSpy_Feb2024)(Citation: K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022) ","relationship_id":"relationship--c1d853f3-660d-4c65-a977-3823d4d5ecd3","references":[{"source_name":"K7Dhanalakshmi_VajraSpy_April2022","description":"Dhanalakshmi. (2022, April 19).  VajraSpy – An Android RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2025.","url":"https://labs.k7computing.com/index.php/vajraspy-an-android-rat/"},{"source_name":"ESET_VajraSpy_Feb2024","description":"Stefanko, L. (2024, February 1). VajraSpy: A Patchwork of espionage apps. Retrieved October 27, 2025.","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/vajraspy-patchwork-espionage-apps/"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G0034","name":"Sandworm Team","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"[Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) can collect encrypted Telegram and Signal communications.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm)","relationship_id":"relationship--c0f03d23-03d6-4457-b783-792d1b8f2994","references":[{"source_name":"mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm","description":"Roncone, G. et al. (n.d.). APT44: Unearthing Sandworm. Retrieved July 11, 2024.","url":"https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt44-unearthing-sandworm.pdf"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M1006","name":"Use Recent OS Version","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1006","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Android 9 introduced a new security policy that prevents applications from reading or writing data to other applications’ internal storage directories, regardless of permissions. ","relationship_id":"relationship--3ebcd3d8-dd8e-4cc9-8087-ce9e93df6f56","references":[]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T1409":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/mobile/T1409/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"mobile/T1409","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0114","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","permission":"android.permission.CAMERA","declared":true,"granted":false}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0123","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"package":"test.example.lab","state_before":"background","state_after":"foreground","source":"own_app_callback"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0055","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"path":"C:\\Lab\\demo.txt","access":"read","actor":"LAB\\analyst","result":"success"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0018","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"asset_id":"lab-host-1","status":"degraded","heartbeat_age_seconds":90,"collector_healthy":true}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0078","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"source_ip":"192.0.2.10","destination_ip":"198.51.100.20","destination_port":443,"protocol":"tcp","bytes_sent":128,"bytes_received":512}}]}}