Complete technique description
Adversaries may modify software and device credentials to prevent operator and responder access. Depending on the device, the modification or addition of this password could prevent any device configuration actions from being accomplished and may require a factory reset or replacement of hardware. These credentials are often built-in features provided by the device vendors as a means to restrict access to management interfaces.
An adversary with access to valid or hardcoded credentials could change the credential to prevent future authorized device access. Change Credential may be especially damaging when paired with other techniques such as Modify Program, Data Destruction, or Modify Controller Tasking. In these cases, a device’s configuration may be destroyed or include malicious actions for the process environment, which cannot not be removed through normal device configuration actions.
Additionally, recovery of the device and original configuration may be difficult depending on the features provided by the device. In some cases, these passwords cannot be removed onsite and may require that the device be sent back to the vendor for additional recovery steps.
A chain of incidents occurred in Germany, where adversaries locked operators out of their building automation system (BAS) controllers by enabling a previously unset BCU key. [German BAS Lockout Dec 2021]
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
Application Log Content · source-mapped
DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0038",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "lab-portal",
"action": "export_requested",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"record_count": 3,
"result": "authorized"
}
}
Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
Network Traffic Content · source-mapped
DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0085",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
"protocol": "http",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/lab-check",
"payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
User Account Authentication · source-mapped
DC0002 collection page — Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
- Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
- Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.
Required normalized fields: account, application, result, reason, source_ip.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0002",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"account": "analyst@example.test",
"application": "lab-portal",
"result": "failure",
"reason": "invalid_credential",
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
}
}
Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.