{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0892","id":"T0892","name":"Change Credential","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0892","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"1f88ffd761d9928e856a2d16df9a4c82189c02bdfbcf40afbb6594c8b3e8d34f","description":"Adversaries may modify software and device credentials to prevent operator and responder access. Depending on the device, the modification or addition of this password could prevent any device configuration actions from being accomplished and may require a factory reset or replacement of hardware. These credentials are often built-in features provided by the device vendors as a means to restrict access to management interfaces.\n\nAn adversary with access to valid or hardcoded credentials could change the credential to prevent future authorized device access. Change Credential may be especially damaging when paired with other techniques such as Modify Program, Data Destruction, or Modify Controller Tasking. In these cases, a device’s configuration may be destroyed or include malicious actions for the process environment, which cannot not be removed through normal device configuration actions. \n\nAdditionally, recovery of the device and original configuration may be difficult depending on the features provided by the device. In some cases, these passwords cannot be removed onsite and may require that the device be sent back to the vendor for additional recovery steps.\n\n\nA chain of incidents occurred in Germany, where adversaries locked operators out of their building automation system (BAS) controllers by enabling a previously unset BCU key. (Citation: German BAS Lockout Dec 2021) \n","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0892","external_id":"T0892"},{"source_name":"German BAS Lockout Dec 2021","description":"Kelly Jackson Higgins. (2021, December 20). Lights Out: Cyberattacks Shut Down Building Automation Systems. Retrieved March 30, 2023.","url":"https://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/lights-out-cyberattacks-shut-down-building-automation-systems"}],"platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Application and service audit","description":"Application-emitted audit or operational event content.","collection_focus":"Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.","providers":[{"name":"Application audit logs","scope":"First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.","source_id":"otel"},{"name":"OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines","scope":"Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.","Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.","Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["service","action","actor","record_count","result"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.","sources":[{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per application, client and route: request rate, rare actions, failure ratios and unusual state transitions. Version changes, retries, health probes and seasonal load need separate baselines."},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Network and protocol telemetry","description":"Packet or decoded application-protocol content visible at a network sensor.","collection_focus":"Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.","providers":[{"name":"Zeek","scope":"Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.","source_id":"zeek"},{"name":"Suricata EVE","scope":"Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.","source_id":"suricata"}],"configuration":["Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.","Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.","Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["flow_id","protocol","method","path","payload_excerpt"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.","sources":[{"id":"zeek","title":"Zeek protocol and connection logs","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/reference/logs/index.html"},{"id":"zeek_start","title":"Zeek capture setup","url":"https://docs.zeek.org/en/current/quickstart.html"},{"id":"suricata","title":"Suricata EVE JSON output","url":"https://docs.suricata.io/en/latest/output/eve/eve-json-output.html"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects."},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Endpoint activity","description":"Creation of a process with executable, command line, parent and security context.","collection_focus":"Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Sysmon","scope":"Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.","source_id":"sysmon"},{"name":"Linux Audit","scope":"Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.","source_id":"linux"},{"name":"Apple Endpoint Security clients","scope":"macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.","source_id":"apple"}],"configuration":["On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.","Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.","For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms."],"configuration_example":{"label":"Sysmon filter fragment · merge into the reviewed lab configuration","language":"xml","source_id":"sysmon_config","content":"<EventFiltering>\n  <ProcessCreate onmatch=\"include\">\n    <Image condition=\"is\">C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe</Image>\n  </ProcessCreate>\n</EventFiltering>","note":"This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>."},"required_fields":["process_guid","image","parent_image","command_line","user"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.","sources":[{"id":"sysmon","title":"Microsoft Sysmon events and configuration","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"},{"id":"sysmon_config","title":"Microsoft Sysmon configuration files","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/sysmon/sysmon-configuration-files"},{"id":"linux","title":"Linux Audit rule configuration","url":"https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/auditctl.8.html"},{"id":"apple","title":"Apple Endpoint Security framework for macOS","url":"https://developer.apple.com/documentation/endpointsecurity"},{"id":"process_audit","title":"Microsoft process creation event 4688","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4688"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity."},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component","category":"Identity and SaaS","description":"Authentication attempts and outcomes for a user or workload account.","collection_focus":"Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.","providers":[{"name":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","scope":"Interactive, non-interactive and workload sign-in contexts, subject to tenant features and access.","source_id":"entra"},{"name":"Cloud identity service audit","scope":"Issuer-side credential and administrative events where the service supports them.","source_id":"cloudtrail"},{"name":"Application audit instrumentation","scope":"Application-side use of identities and sessions; design fields without raw tokens.","source_id":"otel"}],"configuration":["Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.","Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.","Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["account","application","result","reason","source_ip"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.","sources":[{"id":"entra","title":"Microsoft Entra sign-in logs","url":"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins"},{"id":"cloudtrail","title":"AWS CloudTrail event categories","url":"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-events.html"},{"id":"otel","title":"OpenTelemetry log data model","url":"https://opentelemetry.io/docs/specs/otel/logs/data-model/"}],"association":"attack_component","anomaly_design":"Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0892","id":"T0892","name":"Change Credential","domain":"ics","platforms":["Embedded","Windows","Linux","Network Devices"],"environments":["cloud-hosted-endpoint","ics-ot","network-infrastructure","onprem"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0892","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0892/","page":"detections/ics/T0892/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":4,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0771","name":"Detection of Change Credential","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--336b9423-5543-4354-bd00-13c614ccdc96","relationship_id":"relationship--2ff351dc-5b86-4a5b-b0f0-7ac1af8f891f","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1903","name":"Analytic 1903","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol commands changing device-level credentials or access codes from a source not in the approved security administration list, where the device subsequently rejects connections from legitimate control system components. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN1903","platforms":["Embedded"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedCredentialAdmins","description":"Accounts authorized to change credentials for ICS service and operator accounts."},{"field":"CredentialChangeImpactWindow","description":"Time window after a credential change within which a service authentication failure is considered directly connected."},{"field":"CredentialRotationSchedule","description":"Documented schedule for routine credential rotation."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0085","component":"Network Traffic Content","name":"NSM:Content","channel":"credential/access code change command from source not in approved security admin list","platforms":["Embedded"],"analytic_id":"AN1903","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN1903","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0085/"}]},{"id":"AN2143","name":"Analytic 2143","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies passwd/chpasswd modification of Industrial Control System (ICS) service account credentials by a User Identifier (UID) that is not a designated system administrator, outside a formal credential rotation procedure. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2143","platforms":["Linux"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedCredentialAdmins","description":"Accounts authorized to change credentials for ICS service and operator accounts."},{"field":"CredentialChangeImpactWindow","description":"Time window after a credential change within which a service authentication failure is considered directly connected."},{"field":"CredentialRotationSchedule","description":"Documented schedule for routine credential rotation."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0032","component":"Process Creation","name":"auditd:SYSCALL","channel":"Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): syscall=execve; passwd/chpasswd targets an ICS service account outside the approved credential-rotation workflow","platforms":["Linux"],"analytic_id":"AN2143","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2143","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0032/"}]},{"id":"AN2196","name":"Analytic 2196","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies network device credential changes such as Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) password modification or Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community string modification from a source not in the approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) subnet, corroborated by syslog showing authentication failures from legitimate NMS systems following the change. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2196","platforms":["Network Devices"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedCredentialAdmins","description":"Accounts authorized to change credentials for ICS service and operator accounts."},{"field":"CredentialChangeImpactWindow","description":"Time window after a credential change within which a service authentication failure is considered directly connected."},{"field":"CredentialRotationSchedule","description":"Documented schedule for routine credential rotation."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"networkdevice:syslog","channel":"AAA/Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) credential change from source not in approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) subnet, followed by authentication failures from legitimate NMS systems","platforms":["Network Devices"],"analytic_id":"AN2196","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2196","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]},{"id":"AN2262","name":"Analytic 2262","guidance":"Real-time monitoring identifies a password change event for an Industrial Control System (ICS) service or operator account performed by an account not in the authorized credential administration role, immediately followed by failed authentication attempts from the Industrial Control System (ICS) service itself. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2262","platforms":["Windows"],"tuning":[{"field":"AuthorizedCredentialAdmins","description":"Accounts authorized to change credentials for ICS service and operator accounts."},{"field":"CredentialChangeImpactWindow","description":"Time window after a credential change within which a service authentication failure is considered directly connected."},{"field":"CredentialRotationSchedule","description":"Documented schedule for routine credential rotation."}],"log_sources":[{"component_id":"DC0002","component":"User Account Authentication","name":"WinEventLog:Security","channel":"Windows Security Event ID 4624/4625: EventCode=4723, 4724 for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) service/operator account by account not in authorized credential admins outside credential rotation schedule","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2262","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2262","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0002/"},{"component_id":"DC0038","component":"Application Log Content","name":"WinEventLog:System","channel":"Industrial Control Systems (ICS) service failing to start (authentication failure) within credential change impact window of the password change event","platforms":["Windows"],"analytic_id":"AN2262","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0771#AN2262","validation":"upstream_definition_not_locally_validated","component_page":"telemetry/DC0038/"}]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"DC0038","name":"Application Log Content","tag":"Application Log Content","page":"telemetry/DC0038/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0085","name":"Network Traffic Content","tag":"Network Traffic Content","page":"telemetry/DC0085/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0032","name":"Process Creation","tag":"Process Creation","page":"telemetry/DC0032/","kind":"attack_component"},{"id":"DC0002","name":"User Account Authentication","tag":"User Account Authentication","page":"telemetry/DC0002/","kind":"attack_component"}],"visibility":"source_mapped","visibility_note":null,"tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) locked out operators by changing the PLCs passwords and IP addresses.(Citation: Tenable Minnesota Water Utilities)","relationship_id":"relationship--f8578dec-7c78-4af3-b62f-4f305bd991bb","references":[{"source_name":"Tenable Minnesota Water Utilities","description":"Research Special Operations. (2026, July 28). Coordinated \"cyberattack\" on U.S. water utilities: What you need to know. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.tenable.com/blog/coordinated-cyberattack-on-minnesota-water-utilities-what-you-need-to-know"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0811","name":"Redundancy of Service","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Retain cold-standby or replacement hardware of similar models to ensure continued operations of critical functions if the primary system is compromised or unavailable. (Citation: M. Rentschler and H. Heine)","relationship_id":"relationship--cb6d67c0-33ba-4c49-ae70-d0e4f0f68794","references":[{"source_name":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine","description":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine   The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877"}]},{"id":"M0927","name":"Password Policies","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.(Citation: CISA June 2013)","relationship_id":"relationship--53af6987-21bb-46fd-bf85-e3eeaa74de1a","references":[{"source_name":"CISA June 2013","description":"CISA 2013, June Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A"}]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans  (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.","relationship_id":"relationship--a717ccc7-0fe6-4a83-951f-5a89037ed927","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0892":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0892/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0892","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0038","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"service":"lab-portal","action":"export_requested","actor":"lab-reader","record_count":3,"result":"authorized"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0085","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"flow_id":"lab-flow-1","protocol":"http","method":"GET","path":"/lab-check","payload_excerpt":"LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0032","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"process_guid":"lab-process-001","image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe","parent_image":"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe","command_line":"whoami","user":"LAB\\analyst"}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"DC0002","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"account":"analyst@example.test","application":"lab-portal","result":"failure","reason":"invalid_credential","source_ip":"192.0.2.10"}}]}}