T0829 Loss of View — Attack Simulation

proposed-hmi-communication-health collection page — Export supported HMI connection diagnostics and distinguish display freeze, stale data and transport failure.

Providers and collection configuration

• OPC UA audit-capable servers: Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.
• Controller, HMI and historian exports: Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.
• Independent lab sensors / safety records: Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.

• Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
• Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
• Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: hmi, controller, connected, last_update_age_seconds.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "proposed-hmi-communication-health",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "hmi": "lab-hmi-1",
    "controller": "lab-controller-1",
    "connected": true,
    "last_update_age_seconds": 2
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements collection page — Use an independently powered/read sensor approved for the fixture; document calibration and independence assumptions.

Providers and collection configuration

• OPC UA audit-capable servers: Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.
• Controller, HMI and historian exports: Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.
• Independent lab sensors / safety records: Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.

• Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
• Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
• Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: tag, independent_value, reported_value, unit.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "tag": "LAB.TankLevel",
    "independent_value": 42.2,
    "reported_value": 42,
    "unit": "percent"
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• S0372 LockerGoga — malware.

  Some of Norsk Hydro's production systems were impacted by a LockerGoga infection. This resulted in a loss of view which forced the company to switch to manual operations. [Kevin Beaumont] [Hydro]

  Exact relationship: relationship--7a55fc66-0d5c-4ef6-af28-d4a4bb84381d
• S0604 Industroyer — malware.

  Industroyer's data wiper component removes the registry image path throughout the system and overwrites all files, rendering the system unusable. [Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017]

  Exact relationship: relationship--9d6f9bba-dd79-4cb6-a0f3-1284e58a6236
• S0607 KillDisk — malware.

  KillDisk erases the master boot record (MBR) and system logs, leaving the system unusable. [Booz Allen Hamilton]

  Exact relationship: relationship--04bf72de-75ba-4d95-ad24-f93ad835180c
• S1157 Fuxnet — malware.

  Fuxnet impaired sensor communication to impacted devices resulting in a loss of view condition for overall system monitoring.[Claroty Fuxnet 2024]

  Exact relationship: relationship--7200f777-0ddd-4c9c-a022-26d49ea524d3

• M0810 Out-of-Band Communications Channel

  Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.
  

• M0811 Redundancy of Service

  Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. [M. Rentschler and H. Heine]
  

• M0953 Data Backup

  Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [Department of Homeland Security October 2009], including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.