{"source_checked_on":"2026-10-19","schema_version":1,"key":"ics/T0829","id":"T0829","name":"Loss of View","domain":"ics","reviewed_on":"2026-09-28","source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829","source_file":{"file":"ics.json","url":"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data/20664a889568dce884a1dac0ec7b12ae3a199f51/ics-attack/ics-attack-20.0.json","sha256":"c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183","bytes":5266683},"source_object_sha256":"f3ebe442d61d02f3ef3a8b46fe7410e934581397411b06ec99a5cbb3946f9c9b","description":"Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay)","references":[{"source_name":"mitre-attack","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829","external_id":"T0829"},{"source_name":"Corero","description":"Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf"},{"source_name":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee","description":"Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee SANS Industrial Control System (ICS) Security; The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved 2024/11/25","url":"https://icscsi.org/library/Documents/White_Papers/SANS%20-%20ICS%20Cyber%20Kill%20Chain.pdf"},{"source_name":"Tyson Macaulay","description":"Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero   Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04  The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04  RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 ","url":"https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false"}],"platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","parent":null,"children":[],"telemetry":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","name":"HMI communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"HMI-to-controller/historian connection and update status.","collection_focus":"Export supported HMI connection diagnostics and distinguish display freeze, stale data and transport failure.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["hmi","controller","connected","last_update_age_seconds"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"hmi":"lab-hmi-1","controller":"lab-controller-1","connected":true,"last_update_age_seconds":2}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input","category":"Industrial operations and physical process","description":"A separate physical measurement used to check values reported by the control system.","collection_focus":"Use an independently powered/read sensor approved for the fixture; document calibration and independence assumptions.","providers":[{"name":"OPC UA audit-capable servers","scope":"Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.","source_id":"opc"},{"name":"Controller, HMI and historian exports","scope":"Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.","source_id":"ot"},{"name":"Independent lab sensors / safety records","scope":"Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.","source_id":"ot"}],"configuration":["Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.","Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.","Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs."],"configuration_example":null,"required_fields":["tag","independent_value","reported_value","unit"],"example":{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}},"example_note":"Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.","limitations":"There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.","sources":[{"id":"opc","title":"OPC UA audit event model","url":"https://reference.opcfoundation.org/specs/OPC-10000-3/9.5"},{"id":"ot","title":"NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: OT security","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/82/r3/final"}],"association":"proposed_input","anomaly_design":"Per asset, operating mode and engineering change window: deviations in command/state sequences, measurement residuals and communication freshness. Use a simulator or approved test rig; never generate hazardous physical effects."}],"detection":{"key":"ics/T0829","id":"T0829","name":"Loss of View","domain":"ics","platforms":["None"],"environments":["ics-ot"],"source_url":"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829","technique_page":"techniques/ics/T0829/","page":"detections/ics/T0829/","status":"guidance_only","counts":{"sigma":0,"atlas_basic":0,"atlas_anomaly":0,"strategies":1,"analytics":1,"live_validated":0},"sigma_rules":[],"atlas_basic":[],"atlas_anomaly":[],"anomaly_types":[],"strategies":[{"id":"DET0763","name":"Detection of Loss of View","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0763","stix_id":"x-mitre-detection-strategy--a995ba7c-c2c2-4d74-a3da-74e5a192099b","relationship_id":"relationship--44dd2e01-9aca-44c4-bfb8-05d16c928793","description":"","analytics":[{"id":"AN1895","name":"Analytic 1895","guidance":"No standard detection method currently exists for this technique.","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0763#AN1895","platforms":["None"],"tuning":[],"log_sources":[]}]}],"telemetry_references":[{"id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","name":"HMI communication health","tag":"Proposed: HMI communication health","page":"telemetry/proposed-hmi-communication-health/","kind":"proposed_input"},{"id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","name":"Independent physical process measurements","tag":"Proposed: Independent physical process measurements","page":"telemetry/proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements/","kind":"proposed_input"}],"visibility":"no_standard_source_mapping","visibility_note":"Analyst-proposed lab instrumentation, not an official ATT&CK component mapping or a validated detection. It may observe effects without establishing malicious intent.","tool_references":[],"related_parent":null,"article_url":"https://1200km.com/articles/read/2026/2026-04-20-malicious-activity-as-a-statistical-signal-a-detection-engineering-analysis-of-anomaly-bas-90df8b6dea12/","validation":{"source_join":"exact_ids","sigma_yaml":"parsed","backend_compilation":"not_run","live_telemetry":"not_run","detection_execution":"not_run"}},"tools":[],"software":[{"id":"S0372","name":"LockerGoga","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372","kind":"malware","description":"Some of Norsk Hydro's production systems were impacted by a [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) infection. This resulted in a loss of view which forced the company to switch to manual operations. (Citation: Kevin Beaumont) (Citation: Hydro)","relationship_id":"relationship--7a55fc66-0d5c-4ef6-af28-d4a4bb84381d","references":[{"source_name":"Hydro","description":"Hydro Kevin Beaumont   How Lockergoga took down Hydro  ransomware used in targeted attacks aimed at big business Retrieved. 2019/10/16  Retrieved. 2019/10/16 ","url":"https://www.hydro.com/en/media/on-the-agenda/cyber-attack/"},{"source_name":"Kevin Beaumont","description":"Kevin Beaumont   How Lockergoga took down Hydro  ransomware used in targeted attacks aimed at big business Retrieved. 2019/10/16 ","url":"https://doublepulsar.com/how-lockergoga-took-down-hydro-ransomware-used-in-targeted-attacks-aimed-at-big-business-c666551f5880"}]},{"id":"S0604","name":"Industroyer","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604","kind":"malware","description":"[Industroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0604)'s data wiper component removes the registry image path throughout the system and overwrites all files, rendering the system unusable. (Citation: Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017)","relationship_id":"relationship--9d6f9bba-dd79-4cb6-a0f3-1284e58a6236","references":[{"source_name":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET June 2017","description":"Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ","url":"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf"}]},{"id":"S0607","name":"KillDisk","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607","kind":"malware","description":"[KillDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0607) erases the master boot record (MBR) and system logs, leaving the system unusable. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton)","relationship_id":"relationship--04bf72de-75ba-4d95-ad24-f93ad835180c","references":[{"source_name":"Booz Allen Hamilton","description":"Booz Allen Hamilton. (2016). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved December 18, 2024.","url":"https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf"}]},{"id":"S1157","name":"Fuxnet","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157","kind":"malware","description":"[Fuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157) impaired sensor communication to impacted devices resulting in a loss of view condition for overall system monitoring.(Citation: Claroty Fuxnet 2024)","relationship_id":"relationship--7200f777-0ddd-4c9c-a022-26d49ea524d3","references":[{"source_name":"Claroty Fuxnet 2024","description":"Team82. (2024, April 12). Unpacking the Blackjack Group's Fuxnet Malware. Retrieved September 11, 2024.","url":"https://claroty.com/team82/research/unpacking-the-blackjack-groups-fuxnet-malware"}]}],"actors":[{"id":"G1027","name":"CyberAv3ngers","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027","kind":"intrusion-set","description":"During the [2026 Iranian Water Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0065), [CyberAv3ngers](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027) manipulated process logic, HMI, and SCADA displays, which may disrupt operators view of the system.(Citation: CISA-AA26-097A)","relationship_id":"relationship--5526e92e-070b-402e-b149-a06bff5a4549","references":[{"source_name":"CISA-AA26-097A","description":"Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2026, July 22). Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2026.","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a"}]}],"mitigations":[{"id":"M0810","name":"Out-of-Band Communications Channel","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage  (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013). Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--ecf39e19-439f-4e9a-97c2-673ce4eb0a1a","references":[{"source_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013","description":"National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf"}]},{"id":"M0811","name":"Redundancy of Service","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. (Citation: M. Rentschler and H. Heine)\n","relationship_id":"relationship--8ecf5eac-7767-411b-b54a-b374ea51b9e9","references":[{"source_name":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine","description":"M. Rentschler and H. Heine   The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ","url":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877"}]},{"id":"M0953","name":"Data Backup","url":"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953","kind":"course-of-action","description":"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.  Maintain and exercise incident response plans  (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of gold-copy back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.\n","relationship_id":"relationship--eecca3e7-4db5-40d4-b04c-13f84701acb3","references":[{"source_name":"Department of Homeland Security October 2009","description":"Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ","url":"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf"}]}],"candidates":[],"simulation":{"atomic_status":"no_atomic_candidate","lab_execution":"not_run","browser_attack_runner":false,"prerequisites":"Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.","scenario":null},"validation":{"source_identity":"checked_against_pinned_source","relationship_join":"exact_ids_no_inheritance","page_contract":"automated_checks_required","sensor_capture":"not_run","detection_backend":"not_run","adversary_simulation":"not_run","independent_incident_fact_check":"not_performed"},"technique_links":{"T0829":"/ttp-simulation/techniques/ics/T0829/"},"synthetic":{"schema":"1200km.ttp.collection-fixture.v1","synthetic":true,"technique_key":"ics/T0829","purpose":"Collection/parser contract exercise, NOT a positive example or detection of this TTP.","events":[{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-hmi-communication-health","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"hmi":"lab-hmi-1","controller":"lab-controller-1","connected":true,"last_update_age_seconds":2}},{"schema":"1200km.telemetry.example.v1","synthetic":true,"timestamp":"2026-09-27T12:00:00Z","telemetry_id":"proposed-independent-physical-process-measurements","collector":"illustrative-lab-collector","observation":{"tag":"LAB.TankLevel","independent_value":42.2,"reported_value":42,"unit":"percent"}}]}}