T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over…

Technique description

At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.

Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models

Documented simulation candidates

Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (NET USE)
windows automated powershell
Procedure 183235ca-8e6c-422c-88c2-3aa28c4825d9; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
Exfiltration Over SMB over QUIC (New-SmbMapping)
windows automated powershell
Procedure d8d13303-159e-4f33-89f4-9f07812d016f; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprise cloud-hosted-endpoint onprem virtualization ESXi Linux macOS Windows lateral-movement isolated_authorized_lab procedure_review_required telemetry_configuration_required some_candidates_require_elevation

can_simulate technique source_mapped

Detection and collection

T1570 detection workspace

Attack tools

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Connected anomaly research

Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.

Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.