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T1219 Remote Access Tools — Attack Simulation

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and…

Complete technique description

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management.[Symantec Living off the Land][CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report][CrySyS Blog TeamSpy] Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Remote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. It may also be used as a malware component to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.

Installation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).[Google Chrome Remote Desktop][Chrome Remote Desktop]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

File Creation · source-mapped

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Connection Creation · source-mapped

DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0082",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "initiated": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Service Creation · source-mapped

DC0060 collection page — Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: service, action, executable, actor.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0060",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "LabService",
    "action": "install",
    "executable": "C:\\Lab\\service.exe",
    "actor": "lab-admin"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Windows Registry Key Creation · source-mapped

DC0056 collection page — Use RegistryEvent (12) and filter CreateKey/CreateValue as available; retain target object and process identity.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.

Required normalized fields: registry_path, event_type, process_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0056",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "registry_path": "HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Demo",
    "event_type": "CreateKey",
    "process_id": 4200
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Windows Registry Key Modification · source-mapped

DC0063 collection page — Use RegistryEvent 13 for value-set and 14 for rename; compare against intended policy and keep original type/value where available.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.

Required normalized fields: registry_path, event_type, value_type, value.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0063",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "registry_path": "HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Mode",
    "event_type": "SetValue",
    "value_type": "DWORD",
    "value": 1
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0496 Behavior-Chain Detection for Remote Access Tools (Tool-Agnostic)

MITRE detection strategy

AN1366 Analytic 1366

Chain of remote access tool behavior: (1) initial execution of remote-control/assist agent or GUI under user context; (2) persistence via service or autorun; (3) long-lived outbound connection/tunnel to external infrastructure; (4) interactive control signals such as shell or file-manager child processes spawned by the RAT parent.

Platforms: Windows.

AN1367 Analytic 1367

Sequence of RAT agent execution, systemd persistence, and long-lived external egress; optional interactive shells spawned from the agent.

Platforms: Linux.

  • Process Creation — auditd:SYSCALL; channel execve: Agent/headless flags (listen/connect/reverse/tunnel) or remote-control binaries spawning shells.
  • File Creation — auditd:PATH; channel WRITE: Drop of binaries/scripts in ~/.local, /tmp, or /opt tool dirs.
  • Network Connection Creation — WinEventLog:Sysmon; channel EventCode=3, 22.

AN1368 Analytic 1368

Electron/GUI or headless RAT execution followed by LaunchAgent/Daemon persistence and persistent external connections; interactive children (osascript/sh/curl) spawned by parent.

Platforms: macOS.

  • Process Creation — macos:unifiedlog; channel Process exec of remote-control apps or binaries with headless/connect flags.
  • File Creation — macos:osquery; channel CREATE/MODIFY: Creation of LaunchAgents/Daemons plists in user/system locations.
  • Network Connection Creation — macos:osquery; channel CONNECT: Long-lived connections from remote-control parents to external IPs/domains.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

6 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1219 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

7 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 15 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Ammyy Admin Software Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Ammyy Admin will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 0ae9e327-3251-465a-a53b-485d4e3f58fa · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • Ammyy_Admin_Path: Path of Ammyy Admin executable (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ammyy.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Ammyy Admin must exist on disk at the specified location (#{Ammyy_Admin_Path})
UltraViewer - RAT Execution

A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 19acf63b-55c4-4b6a-8552-00a8865105c8 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • UltraViewer_Path: Path to the UltraViewer executable. (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_UltraViewer.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Ultraviewer installer must be downloaded and exist on the disk at the specified location. (#{UltraViewer_Path})
Microsoft App Quick Assist Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick a user into executing Microsoft Quick Assist Microsoft Store app and connect to the user's machine.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 1aea6d15-70f1-4b4e-8b02-397b5d5ffe75 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

GoToAssist Files Detected Test on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading GoToAssist and use to establish C2. Download of GoToAssist installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 1b72b3bd-72f8-4b63-a30b-84e91b9c3578 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • installer_path: where GoToAssist will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GoToAssist.exe)
  • download_url: url to download GoToAssist from (type url; source default https://launch.getgo.com/launcher2/helper?token=e0-FaCddxmtMoX8_cY4czssnTeGvy83ihp8CLREfvwQshiBW0_RcbdoaEp8IA-Qn8wpbKlpGIflS-39gW6RuWRM-XHwtkRVMLBsp5RSKp-a3PBM-Pb1Fliy73EDgoaxr-q83WtXbLKqD7-u3cfDl9gKsymmhdkTGsXcDXir90NqKj92LsN_KpyYwV06lIxsdRekhNZjNwhkWrBa_hG8RQJqWSGk6tkZLVMuMufmn37eC2Cqqiwq5bCGnH5dYiSUUsklSedRLjh4N46qPYT1bAU0qD25ZPr-Kvf4Kzu9bT02q3Yntj02ZA99TxL2-SKzgryizoopBPg4Ilfo5t78UxKTYeEwo4etQECfkCRvenkTRlIHmowdbd88zz7NiccXnbHJZehgs6_-JSVjQIdPTXZbF9T5z44mi4BQYMtZAS3DE86F0C3D4Tcd7fa5F6Ve8rQWt7pvqFCYyiJAailslxOw0LsGyFokoy65tMF980ReP8zhVcTKYP8s8mhGXihUQJQPNk20Sw"&"downloadTrigger=restart"&"renameFile=1)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • GoToAssist must exist on disk at the specified location (#{installer_path})
Splashtop Streamer Execution

An adversary may attempt to use Splashtop Streamer to gain unattended remote interactive access. Upon successful execution, Splashtop streamer will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 3e1858ee-3550-401c-86ec-5e70ed79295b · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • srserver_exe: Splashtop streamer installation executables (type string; source default SRServer.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Splashtop Streamer must be installed in the location
UltraVNC Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 42e51815-a6cc-4c75-b970-3f0ff54b610e · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • UltraVNC_Viewer_Path: Path of UltraVNC Viewer executable (type path; source default $env:ProgramFiles\'uvnc bvba\UltraVnc\vncviewer.exe')

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • UltraVNC must exist at (#{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path})
ScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory.
Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 4a18cc4e-416f-4966-9a9d-75731c4684c0 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • installer_path: where the AnyDesk will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AnyDesk.exe)
  • download_url: url to download AnyDesk from (type url; source default https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • AnyDesk must exist on disk at the specified location (#{installer_path})
TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • installer_path: where the installer will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\TeamViewer_Setup_x64.exe)
  • download_url: url to download teamviewer from (type url; source default https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup_x64.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • TeamViewer installer must exist on disk at the specified location (#{installer_path})
Splashtop Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · b025c580-029e-4023-888d-a42710d76934 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • Splashtop_Path: Path of Splashtop executable (type path; source default ${env:programfiles(x86)}\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Client for STP\strwinclt.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Splashtop must exist at "#{Splashtop_Path}"
MSP360 Connect Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · b1b8128b-c5d4-4de9-bf70-e60419274562 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • MSP360_Connect_Path: Path of MSP360 executable (type path; source default $env:ProgramFiles\Connect\Connect.exe)
  • MSP360_Download_Url: URL to download MSP360 Connect from (type url; source default )

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • MSP360 must exist at (#{MSP360_Connect_Path})
LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • installer_path: where the installer will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\LogMeInIgnition.msi)
  • download_url: url to download LogMeIn from (type url; source default https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • LogMeIn installer must exist on disk at the specified location (#{installer_path})
NetSupport - RAT Execution

A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.

Pinned Atomic procedure · ecca999b-e0c8-40e8-8416-ad320b146a75 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • NetSupport_Path: Path to the NetSupport executable. (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_NetSupport.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • NetSupport must be downloaded and exist on the disk at the specified location. (#{NetSupport_Path})
RustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk and use this to maintain access to the machine.
Download of RustDesk installer will be at the destination location when successfully executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · f1641ba9-919a-4323-b74f-33372333bf0e · windows · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • installer_path: where the installer will be downloaded to or already is located (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe)
  • download_url: url to download teamviewer from (type url; source default https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • RustDesk must exist on disk at the specified location (#{installer_path})
RemotePC Software Execution

An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RemotePC Software for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, RemotePC will be executed.

Pinned Atomic procedure · fbff3f1f-b0bf-448e-840f-7e1687affdce · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • RemotePC_Path: Path of RemotePC executable (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\RemotePC.exe)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • RemotePC must exist on disk at the specified location (#{RemotePC_Path})

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1219 Remote Access Tools; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Remote Access Tools, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1219 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.