T1072 Software Deployment Tools — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems…

Technique description

At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.

Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models

Documented simulation candidates

Deploy 7-Zip Using Chocolatey
windows automated powershell
Procedure 2169e8b0-2ee7-44cb-8a6e-d816a5db7d8a; elevation not declared required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
Radmin Viewer Utility
windows automated command_prompt
Procedure b4988cad-6ed2-434d-ace5-ea2670782129; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
PDQ Deploy RAT
windows automated command_prompt
Procedure e447b83b-a698-4feb-bed1-a7aaf45c3443; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.

Connected ecosystem references

Detection and collection

T1072 detection workspace

Attack tools

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.