Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
File Access · source-mapped
DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.
Providers and collection configuration
- Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
- For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
- Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0055",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"access": "read",
"actor": "LAB\\analyst",
"result": "success"
}
}
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
Module Load · source-mapped
DC0016 collection page — Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_id, image_loaded, signed, action.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0016",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"image_loaded": "C:\\Lab\\demo.dll",
"signed": false,
"action": "load"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
OS API Execution · source-mapped
DC0021 collection page — Use an approved EDR trace or instrument the owned lab process at selected APIs. Define API name, caller, sanitized arguments and return status.
Providers and collection configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Required normalized fields: process_id, api, path, result.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0021",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"api": "CreateFileW",
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"result": "success"
}
}
Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
Process Access · source-mapped
DC0035 collection page — Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: source_process_id, target_process_id, granted_access, action.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0035",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"source_process_id": 4200,
"target_process_id": 4300,
"granted_access": "0x1000",
"action": "open_process"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Process Metadata · source-mapped
DC0034 collection page — Collect read-only process inventory with PID plus start time/stable identity, command line and collection time; restrict access to potentially sensitive arguments.
Providers and collection configuration
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Required normalized fields: process_id, image, owner_uid, started_at.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0034",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"image": "/usr/bin/sleep",
"owner_uid": 1000,
"started_at": "2026-09-27T11:59:00Z"
}
}
Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
Process Modification · source-mapped
DC0020 collection page — Use Sysmon ProcessTampering (25) for supported detections and corroborating EDR/memory evidence; it is not a record of every memory write.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_id, observation, sensor.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0020",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"observation": "process_image_changed",
"sensor": "lab-instrumentation"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Simulation design and documented procedures
Atomic evidence: 13 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
UUID custom process Injection
The UUIDs Process Injection code was first introduced by the NCC Group. The code can be stored in UUID forms on the heap and converted back to binary via UuidFromStringA at runtime. In this new custom version of UUID injection, EnumSystemLocalesA is the only API called to execute the code. We used custom UuidToString and UuidFromString implementations to avoid using UuidFromStringA and RPCRT4.dll, thereby eliminating the static signatures. This technique also avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateThread
The injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.
Reference to NCC Group: https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
Concept from: http://ropgadget.com/posts/abusing_win_functions.html
Pinned Atomic procedure · 0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5304734f1e1 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
exe_binary: PE binary (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\uuid_injection.exe)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
1 prerequisite definitions:
- Portable Executable to inject must exist at specified location (#{exe_binary})
Read-Write-Execute process Injection
This test exploited the vulnerability in legitimate PE formats where sections have RWX permission and enough space for shellcode.
The RWX injection avoided the use of VirtualAlloc, WriteVirtualMemory, and ProtectVirtualMemory, thus evading detection mechanisms
that relied on API call sequences and heuristics. The RWX injection utilises API call sequences: LoadLibrary --> GetModuleInformation --> GetModuleHandleA --> RtlCopyMemory --> CreateThread.
The injected shellcode will open a message box and a notepad.
RWX Process Injection, also known as MockingJay, was introduced to the security community by SecurityJoes.
More details can be found at https://www.securityjoes.com/post/process-mockingjay-echoing-rwx-in-userland-to-achieve-code-execution.
The original injector and idea were developed for game cheats, as visible at https://github.com/M-r-J-o-h-n/SWH-Injector.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 0128e48e-8c1a-433a-a11a-a5387384f1e1 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
vuln_dll: vulnerable DLL (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\bin\x64\vuln_dll\msys-2.0.dll)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
1 prerequisite definitions:
- Utility to inject must exist on disk at specified location (#{vuln_dll})
Shellcode execution via VBA
This module injects shellcode into a newly created process and executes. By default the shellcode is created,
with Metasploit, for use on x86-64 Windows 10 machines.
Note: Due to the way the VBA code handles memory/pointers/injection, a 64bit installation of Microsoft Office
is required.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 1c91e740-1729-4329-b779-feba6e71d048 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
txt_path: Path to file containing VBA macro to run (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1055\src\x64\T1055-macrocode.txt)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
2 prerequisite definitions:
- The 64-bit version of Microsoft Office must be installed
- "#{txt_path}" must exist on disk at specified location
Process Injection with Go using UuidFromStringA WinAPI
Uses WinAPI UuidFromStringA to load shellcode to a memory address then executes the shellcode using EnumSystemLocalesA.
With this technique, memory is allocated on the heap and does not use commonly suspicious APIs such as VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, or CreateThread
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#uuidfromstringa)
- References:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/23/rift-analysing-a-lazarus-shellcode-execution-method/
- https://twitter.com/_CPResearch_/status/1352310521752662018
- https://blog.securehat.co.uk/process-injection/shellcode-execution-via-enumsystemlocala
Pinned Atomic procedure · 2315ce15-38b6-46ac-a3eb-5e21abef2545 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI
This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed
This program leverages the functions from golang.org/x/sys/windows to call Windows procedures instead of manually loading them
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthread)
Pinned Atomic procedure · 2871ed59-3837-4a52-9107-99500ebc87cb · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Process Injection with Go using CreateThread WinAPI (Natively)
This program executes shellcode in the current process using the following steps
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Call CreateThread on shellcode address
5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed
This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createthreadnative)
Pinned Atomic procedure · 2a3c7035-d14f-467a-af94-933e49fe6786 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI (Natively)
Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellcode in a remote process.
This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
6. Close the handle to the remote process
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethreadnative)
Pinned Atomic procedure · 2a4ab5c1-97ad-4d6d-b5d3-13f3a6c94e39 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
spawn_process_path: Path of the binary to spawn (type string; source default C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe)spawn_process_name: Name of the process spawned (type string; source default werfault)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Remote Process Injection in LSASS via mimikatz
Use mimikatz to remotely (via psexec) dump LSASS process content for RID 500 via code injection (new thread).
Especially useful against domain controllers in Active Directory environments.
It must be executed in the context of a user who is privileged on remote `machine`.
The effect of `/inject` is explained in <https://blog.3or.de/mimikatz-deep-dive-on-lsadumplsa-patch-and-inject.html>
Pinned Atomic procedure · 3203ad24-168e-4bec-be36-f79b13ef8a83 · windows · command_prompt.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
machine: machine to target (via psexec) (type string; source default DC1)mimikatz_path: Mimikatz windows executable (type path; source default %tmp%\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe)psexec_path: Path to PsExec (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
2 prerequisite definitions:
- Mimikatz executor must exist on disk and at specified location (#{mimikatz_path})
- PsExec tool from Sysinternals must exist on disk at specified location (#{psexec_path})
Dirty Vanity process Injection
This test used the Windows undocumented remote-fork API RtlCreateProcessReflection to create a cloned process of the parent process
with shellcode written in its memory. The shellcode is executed after being forked to the child process. The technique was first presented at
BlackHat Europe 2022. Shellcode will open a messsage box and a notepad.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 49543237-25db-497b-90df-d0a0a6e8fe2c · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
pid: Parent process ID (type string; source default (Start-Process calc.exe -PassThru).Id)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Remote Process Injection with Go using CreateRemoteThread WinAPI
Leverages the Windows CreateRemoteThread function from Kernel32.dll to execute shellocde in a remote process.
This application leverages functions from the golang.org/x/sys/windows package, where feasible, like the windows.OpenProcess().
Steps taken with this technique
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with CreateRemoteThread
6. Close the handle to the remote process
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode#createremotethread)
- References:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/code-injection-process-injection/process-injection
Pinned Atomic procedure · 69534efc-d5f5-4550-89e6-12c6457b9edd · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
spawn_process_path: Path of the binary to spawn (type string; source default C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe)spawn_process_name: Name of the process spawned (type string; source default werfault)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Process Injection with Go using EtwpCreateEtwThread WinAPI
Uses EtwpCreateEtwThread function from ntdll.dll to execute shellcode within the application's process.
This program loads the DLLs and gets a handle to the used procedures itself instead of using the windows package directly.
Steps taken with this technique
1. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAlloc setting the page permissions to Read/Write
2. Use the RtlCopyMemory macro to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space
3. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtect
4. Call EtwpCreateEtwThread on shellcode address
5. Call WaitForSingleObject so the program does not end before the shellcode is executed
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#EtwpCreateEtwThread)
- References:
- https://gist.github.com/TheWover/b2b2e427d3a81659942f4e8b9a978dc3
- https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/ntdll/api/etw/index.htm
Pinned Atomic procedure · 7362ecef-6461-402e-8716-7410e1566400 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Remote Process Injection with Go using RtlCreateUserThread WinAPI
Executes shellcode in a remote process.
Steps taken with this technique
1. Get a handle to the target process
2. Allocate memory for the shellcode with VirtualAllocEx setting the page permissions to Read/Write
3. Use the WriteProcessMemory to copy the shellcode to the allocated memory space in the remote process
4. Change the memory page permissions to Execute/Read with VirtualProtectEx
5. Execute the entrypoint of the shellcode in the remote process with RtlCreateUserThread
6. Close the handle to the remote process
- PoC Credit: (https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/go-shellcode/tree/master#rtlcreateuserthread)
- References:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/blog/cobalt-strikes-process-injection-the-details-cobalt-strike
Pinned Atomic procedure · a0c1725f-abcd-40d6-baac-020f3cf94ecd · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
spawn_process_path: Path of the binary to spawn (type string; source default C:\Windows\System32\werfault.exe)spawn_process_name: Name of the process spawned (type string; source default werfault)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Section View Injection
This test creates a section object in the local process followed by a local section view.
The shellcode is copied into the local section view and a remote section view is created in the target process, pointing to the local section view.
A thread is then created in the target process, using the remote section view as start address.
Pinned Atomic procedure · c6952f41-6cf0-450a-b352-2ca8dae7c178 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Technique-specific experiment contract
- Choose one procedure implementing T1055 Process Injection; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
- Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
- Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
- Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
- Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.