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T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.

Complete technique description

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.[Net Use][Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Drive Access · source-mapped

DC0054 collection page — For Windows raw reads, review Sysmon RawAccessRead (9); collect device path and process. Normal file I/O is a different source.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: device_path, process_id, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0054",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "device_path": "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive2",
    "process_id": 4200,
    "action": "raw_read"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

File Access · source-mapped

DC0055 collection page — Enable Audit File System plus a narrow SACL on a lab directory; on Linux select path/syscall rules and join associated Audit records.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: path, access, actor, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0055",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "access": "read",
    "actor": "LAB\\analyst",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

File Creation · source-mapped

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Share Access · source-mapped

DC0102 collection page — Enable Audit File Share / Detailed File Share on the lab file server; correlate share checks with file-system access and requesting host/account.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: share, relative_path, access, source_ip.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0102",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "share": "\\\\lab-server\\demo",
    "relative_path": "demo.txt",
    "access": "read",
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0410 Detection Strategy for Data from Network Shared Drive

MITRE detection strategy

AN1145 Analytic 1145

Monitoring of file access to network shares (e.g., C$, Admin$) followed by unusual read or copy operations by processes not typically associated with such activity (e.g., PowerShell, certutil).

Platforms: Windows.

AN1146 Analytic 1146

Unusual access or copying of files from mounted network drives (e.g., NFS, CIFS/SMB) by user shells or scripts followed by large data transfer.

Platforms: Linux.

  • File Access — auditd:SYSCALL; channel open,read.
  • Drive Access — linux:syslog; channel mount/umount or file copy logs.

AN1147 Analytic 1147

Detection of file access from mounted SMB shares followed by copy or exfil commands from Terminal or script interpreter processes.

Platforms: macOS.

  • File Access — macos:unifiedlog; channel filesystem and process events.
  • Drive Access — fs:fsusage; channel open/read/mount operations.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

2 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1039 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

4 source-documented software associations
  • S0050 CosmicDuke — malware.

    CosmicDuke steals user files from network shared drives with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[F-Secure Cosmicduke]

    Exact relationship: relationship--3e7c9978-4db1-4ee1-ae27-640acee5a543
  • S0128 BADNEWS — malware.

    When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's mapped drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.[Forcepoint Monsoon]

    Exact relationship: relationship--6c9649b7-00c6-4503-a911-9e8b9086eac4
  • S0458 Ramsay — malware.

    Ramsay can collect data from network drives and stage it for exfiltration.[Eset Ramsay May 2020]

    Exact relationship: relationship--6c692a16-22b8-42bb-9a6b-3c25a2714cf5
  • S0554 Egregor — malware.

    Egregor can collect any files found in the enumerated drivers before sending it to its C2 channel.[NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020]

    Exact relationship: relationship--59c58c73-046c-4e01-9ced-8c049381fcd2

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 2 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with copy

Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with copy cmd
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073

Pinned Atomic procedure · 6ed67921-1774-44ba-bac6-adb51ed60660 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • remote: Remote server name (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • share_file: Remote Path to the file (type path; source default Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password)
  • local_file: Local name (type string; source default Easter_egg.password)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • Administrative share must exist on #{remote}
  • "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" must exist on #{remote}
Copy a sensitive File over Administrative share with Powershell

Copy from sensitive File from the c$ of another LAN computer with powershell
https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1211636381086339073

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7762e120-5879-44ff-97f8-008b401b9a98 · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • remote: Remote server name (type string; source default 127.0.0.1)
  • share_file: Remote Path to the file (type path; source default Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password)
  • local_file: Local name (type string; source default Easter_egg.password)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • Administrative share must exist on #{remote}
  • "\\#{remote}\C$\#{share_file}" must exist on #{remote}

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Data from Network Shared Drive, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprisecloud-hosted-endpointonpremLinuxmacOSWindowscollectionisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requiredsome_candidates_require_elevation
Atomic candidate documentedtechniquesource_mapped

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

windowsautomatedcommand_promptpowershell

Detection and collection

T1039 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.