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Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 9e4b7d3a-6f2c-4e9a-8d1b-3c5e7a9f2b4d. Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService — Sigma Rule. Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process. The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features. While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: @kostastsale. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2026-02-19 / not supplied.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "category": "file_event"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 6878f8ccd3041aaed94676d91839a4e584ec28986b41a0449abb25b487394ba1

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Potentially Suspicious File Creation by OpenEDR's ITSMService
id: 9e4b7d3a-6f2c-4e9a-8d1b-3c5e7a9f2b4d
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of potentially suspicious files by OpenEDR's ITSMService process.
    The ITSMService is responsible for remote management operations and can create files on the system through the Process Explorer or file management features.
    While legitimate for IT operations, creation of executable or script files could indicate unauthorized file uploads, data staging, or malicious file deployment.
author: '@kostastsale'
date: 2026-02-19
references:
    - https://kostas-ts.medium.com/detecting-abuse-of-openedrs-permissive-edr-trial-a-security-researcher-s-perspective-fc55bf53972c
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.t1219
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_process:
        Image|endswith: '\COMODO\Endpoint Manager\ITSMService.exe'
    selection_suspicious_extensions:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.7z'
            - '.bat'
            - '.cmd'
            - '.com'
            - '.dll'
            - '.exe'
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.pif'
            - '.ps1'
            - '.rar'
            - '.scr'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.zip'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate OpenEDR file management operations
    - Authorized remote file uploads by IT administrators
    - Software deployment through OpenEDR console
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Legitimate OpenEDR file management operations
  • Authorized remote file uploads by IT administrators
  • Software deployment through OpenEDR console

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.