1200KM / sigma-rule
Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462. Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process — Sigma Rule. Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key. This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-04-09 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 81819bd76789a8dde20cc1a3f69fea17dfcfaae2219d5110d55d4374401f1ea5
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Security Event Logging Disabled via MiniNt Registry Key - Process
id: 1a4bd6af-99ac-4466-b5b2-7b72b4a05462
related:
- id: 8839e550-52d7-4958-9f2f-e13c1e736838 # Disable Security Events Logging Adding Reg Key MiniNt - Registry Set
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key.
This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications.
Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
references:
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/defense-evasion-windows-event-logging-t1562-002/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-04-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685.001
- attack.t1112
- car.2022-03-001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_reg_img:
# Example: reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt"
- Image|endswith: '\reg.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'reg.exe'
selection_reg_cmd:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
selection_powershell_img:
- Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\powershell_ise.exe'
- OriginalFileName:
- 'PowerShell.EXE'
- 'pwsh.dll'
selection_powershell_cmd1:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'New-Item '
- 'ni '
selection_powershell_cmd2:
CommandLine|contains: '\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\MiniNt'
condition: all of selection_reg_* or all of selection_powershell_*
falsepositives:
- Highly Unlikely
level: high
False positives
- Highly Unlikely
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.