1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery: 1 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
COUNT(cloud_list_or_describe_operations BY identity, 10m) >= threshold AND identity NOT_IN approved_inventory_roles -> ALERTComparison unit: cloud identity and API action distribution.
Expected behavior: identities use a role-specific action set.
Deviation: peer-group deviation, high API category diversity, or burst of list and describe operations.
Defenders should monitor for suspicious enumeration of cloud infrastructure components via APIs or CLI tools. Observable behaviors include repeated listing or description operations for compute instances, snapshots, storage buckets, and volumes. From a defender’s perspective, risky activity is often identified by new or untrusted identities making discovery calls (e.g., DescribeInstances, ListBuckets, az vm list, gcloud compute instances list), enumeration from unusual geolocations or IPs, or rapid multi-service discovery in sequence. Correlating discovery API usage with later snapshot creation or instance modification provides further context of adversary behavior.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.