1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage — Detection Rules

Detection workspace for T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage: 13 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.

Source-backed rule directory

Atlas deterministic concepts

No exact concept selected.

Anomaly models

No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.

ATT&CK analytic guidance

DET0570 Detection Strategy for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

AN1571 Analytic 1571

Unusual processes (e.g., powershell.exe, excel.exe) accessing large local files and subsequently initiating HTTPS POST requests to domains associated with cloud storage services (e.g., dropbox.com, drive.google.com, box.com). Defender perspective: correlation between file reads in sensitive directories and high outbound traffic volume to known storage APIs.

AN1572 Analytic 1572

Processes such as curl, wget, rclone, or custom scripts executing uploads to cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: detect chained events where tar/gzip is executed to compress files followed by HTTPS PUT/POST requests to known storage services.

AN1573 Analytic 1573

Applications or scripts invoking cloud storage APIs (Dropbox sync, iCloud, Google Drive client) in unexpected contexts. Defender perspective: detect sensitive file reads by non-standard applications followed by unusual encrypted uploads to external cloud storage domains.

AN1574 Analytic 1574

Unusual ESXi processes (vmx, hostd) reading datastore files and generating outbound HTTPS traffic toward external cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: anomalous datastore activity followed by network transfers to Dropbox, AWS S3, or other storage services.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Simulation, tools and telemetry

T1567.002 simulation workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing anomaly research

Original publication snapshot · Anomaly Detection Atlas

Connected anomaly research

Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.

Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.