1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: 22 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
MATCH(privilege_elevation) AND user_or_binary NOT_IN approved_elevation_list -> ALERTComparison unit: identity, host, and elevation action.
Expected behavior: elevation is concentrated among specific roles and tools.
Deviation: peer-group deviation, unusual transition from low to high privilege, or burst of elevation actions.
Correlate registry modifications (e.g., UAC bypass registry keys), unusual parent-child process relationships (e.g., control.exe spawning cmd.exe), and unsigned elevated process executions with non-standard tokens or elevation flags.
Monitor audit logs for setuid/setgid bit changes, executions where UID ≠ EUID (indicative of sudo or privilege escalation), and high-integrity binaries launched by unprivileged users.
Detect execution of `/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline` or use of AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API, and monitor process lineage for unusual launches of GUI apps with escalated privileges.
Monitor for unexpected privilege elevation operations via SAML assertion manipulation, role injection, or changes to identity mappings that result in access escalation.
Detect sudden privilege escalations such as IAM role changes, user-assigned privilege boundaries, or elevation via assumed roles beyond normal behavior.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.