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T1204.002 Malicious File — Detection Rules

Detection workspace for T1204.002 Malicious File: 27 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.

Source-backed rule directory

Atlas deterministic concepts

No exact concept selected.

Anomaly models

No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.

ATT&CK analytic guidance

DET0294 User Execution – Malicious File via download/open → spawn chain (T1204.002)

AN0819 Analytic 0819

User opens a file delivered by email, web, chat, or share. The handler application (Word/PDF reader/archiver) creates a file in user-controlled paths (Downloads, Temp, Desktop) and then spawns a new or unusual child process (e.g., powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe). Optional precursors include FileStreamCreated (URL/UNC) and Office → system32 batch writes.

AN0820 Analytic 0820

User opens a downloaded document/installer leading to EndpointSecurity file create in ~/Downloads or ~/Library paths then an exec of a suspicious utility (osascript, bash/zsh, curl, chmod, open with -a Terminal). Correlates File Creation with subsequent process exec and, optionally, quarantine/LSQuarantine events.

AN0821 Analytic 0821

User or desktop application writes a new file to ~/Downloads, /tmp, or mounted removable media followed by execve of a risky interpreter/loader (bash, sh, python, perl, php, node, curl|wget piping to sh, ld.so, rdesktop, xdg-open - with unusual args). Uses auditd PATH+SYSCALL (open/creat/write/rename) with execve event linking.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Simulation, tools and telemetry

T1204.002 simulation workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing anomaly research

Original publication snapshot · Anomaly Detection Atlas

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.