1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1136 Create Account: 3 Sigma sources, 1 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
MATCH(account_created) AND creator NOT_IN approved_account_provisioners -> ALERTComparison unit: creator, target account type, and time.
Expected behavior: account creation is performed by a small set of provisioning identities following recurring workflows.
Deviation: rare creator, unusual account type, or creation outside expected sequence.
Adversary uses built-in OS tools or API calls to create local or domain accounts for persistence or lateral movement. Tools such as 'net user', PowerShell, or MMC snap-ins may be used. Detection focuses on Event ID 4720 paired with process lineage and user context.
Adversary invokes 'useradd', 'adduser', or equivalent system commands or scripts to create local users. Detection focuses on command execution and audit trail of passwd/shadow file modifications.
Adversary creates new users using 'dscl' commands, GUI tools, or by modifying user plist files. Detection includes monitoring dscl invocation and user-related plist changes.
Adversary creates users via IAM/IdP API or portal (e.g., Azure AD, Okta). Detection involves monitoring API calls, admin action logs, and correlation with role assignments.
Account creation via cloud service APIs or CLI, often associated with key generation. Monitored via CloudTrail or equivalent audit logs.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.