1200KM / detection
Detection workspace for T1070 Indicator Removal: 20 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 1 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
No exact concept selected.
Comparison unit: file or telemetry stream.
Expected behavior: metadata follows causal ordering and log sources emit regularly.
Deviation: impossible timestamp relationships, sudden missing telemetry, or abrupt state change.
Monitors sequences involving deletion/modification of logs, registry keys, scheduled tasks, or prefetch files following suspicious process activity or elevated access escalation.
Detects deletion or overwriting of bash history, syslog, audit logs, and .ssh metadata following privilege elevation or suspicious process spawning.
Detects clearing of unified logs, deletion of plist files tied to persistence, and manipulation of Terminal history after initial execution.
Monitors tampering with audit logs, volumes, or mounted storage often used for side-channel logging (e.g., /var/log inside containers) post-compromise.
Tracks suspicious use of ESXi shell commands or PowerCLI to delete logs, rotate system files, or tamper with hostd/vpxa history.
Detects deletion or hiding of security-related mail rules, audit mailboxes, or calendar/log sync artifacts indicative of tampering post-intrusion.
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.
Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.