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DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c. DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations — Sigma Rule. Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-07-17 / 2023-09-18.

{
  "product": "windows",
  "category": "image_load"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: f7b58125b493e002578db2381f38e17eb4eb453bb5154db9226204f82c67b7a8

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations
id: 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c
status: test
description: Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"
references:
    - https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC (Idea)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1070
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            # TODO: Add more suspicious paths as you see fit in your env
            - 'C:\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Unknown

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.