1200KM / sigma-rule
DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c. DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations — Sigma Rule. Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-07-17 / 2023-09-18.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "image_load"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: f7b58125b493e002578db2381f38e17eb4eb453bb5154db9226204f82c67b7a8
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: DLL Load By System Process From Suspicious Locations
id: 9e9a9002-56c4-40fd-9eff-e4b09bfa5f6c
status: test
description: Detects when a system process (i.e. located in system32, syswow64, etc.) loads a DLL from a suspicious location or a location with permissive permissions such as "C:\Users\Public"
references:
- https://github.com/hackerhouse-opensource/iscsicpl_bypassUAC (Idea)
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-17
modified: 2023-09-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1070
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\'
ImageLoaded|startswith:
# TODO: Add more suspicious paths as you see fit in your env
- 'C:\Users\Public\'
- 'C:\PerfLogs\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.