- AN0334 · Analytic 0334 — Correlated user account modification (reset, disable, deletion) events with anomalous process lineage (e.g., PowerShell or net.exe from an interactive session), especially outside of IT admin change windows or by non-admin users.
- AN0335 · Analytic 0335 — Password changes or account deletions via 'passwd', 'userdel', or 'chage' preceded by interactive shell or remote command execution from non-privileged accounts.
- AN0336 · Analytic 0336 — Execution of dscl or sysadminctl commands to disable, delete, or modify users combined with anomalous process ancestry or terminal session launch.
- AN0337 · Analytic 0337 — Invocation of esxcli 'system account remove' from vCLI, SSH, or vSphere API with anomalous user access or outside maintenance windows.
- AN0338 · Analytic 0338 — O365 UnifiedAuditLog entries for Remove-Mailbox or Set-Mailbox with account disable or delete actions correlated with suspicious login locations or MFA bypass.
- AN0339 · Analytic 0339 — Deletion or disablement of user accounts in platforms like Okta, Salesforce, or Zoom with anomalies in admin session attributes or mass actions within short duration.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Account Access Removal
Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place. In Windows, Net utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of Net. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account: * Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password * Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password * Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted * Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out Alerting on Net and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Scope, business services, assets, dependencies, and data
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 51/100Cloud, DevSecOps, product, and control-as-code governance
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 51/100Authorization, object access, and tenant isolation
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 42/100AI governance, machine-readable controls, and safe GRC automation
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 39/100Linux and macOS endpoint forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Policy architecture, standards, procedures, and exceptions
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 6 — Alert triage, investigation, and escalation
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 51/100Cloud, DevSecOps, product, and control-as-code governance
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 51/100Authorization, object access, and tenant isolation
Secure Code & Application Security · Governed topic match · 42/100AI governance, machine-readable controls, and safe GRC automation
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 39/100Linux and macOS endpoint forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Policy architecture, standards, procedures, and exceptions
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 6 — Alert triage, investigation, and escalation
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.