Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system co…
MITRE mitigation sourceAdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation. Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include: * modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment * modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources * changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller. * adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication. This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details. Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings. Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Cloud Security · Governed topic match · 78/100Kubernetes control plane, RBAC, workload, network, and admission security
Cloud Security · Governed topic match · 78/100Cloud AI/ML, agents, RAG, MCP, and autonomous operations
Cloud Security · Governed topic match · 78/100Multi-cloud, SaaS, suppliers, compliance, and continuous assurance
Cloud Security · Governed topic match · 69/100Source review and static analysis
Vulnerability Research & Exploit Development · Governed topic match · 60/100Module 3 — Vulnerability discovery and validation
Red Team & Offensive Security · Governed topic match · 54/100Module 4 — Detection engineering and detection as code
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Controlled dynamic behavior and differential observation
Malware Analysis & Reverse Engineering · Tactic learning route · 24/100Windows endpoint and identity forensics
Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR) · Tactic learning route · 24/100Binary formats, ABI, loaders, and mitigations
Vulnerability Research & Exploit Development · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Network, edge, service communication, hybrid access, and zero trust
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MF…
MITRE mitigation sourceUser Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90…
MITRE mitigation sourceMITRE detection strategies and analytics
- AN0755 · Analytic 0755 — Adversary modifies Group Policy Objects (GPOs), domain trust, or directory service objects via GUI, CLI, or programmatic APIs. Behavior includes creation/modification of GPOs, delegation permissions, trust objects, or rogue domain controller registration.
- AN0756 · Analytic 0756 — Adversary modifies tenant policy through changes to federation configuration, trust settings, or identity provider additions in Microsoft 365/AzureAD via Portal, PowerShell, or Graph API. Includes setting authentication to federated or updating federated domains.