- AN0507 · Analytic 0507 — Detection of adversary enumeration of domain or local group memberships via native tools such as net.exe, PowerShell, or WMI. This activity may precede lateral movement or privilege escalation.
- AN0508 · Analytic 0508 — Detection of group enumeration using commands like 'id', 'groups', or 'getent group', often followed by privilege escalation or SSH lateral movement.
- AN0509 · Analytic 0509 — Group membership checks via 'dscl', 'dscacheutil', or 'id', typically executed via terminal or automation scripts.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
Main AdversaryGraph project Documentation Malware Analysis GitHub
Permission Groups Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 54/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100Data classification, storage, cryptography, keys, backup, and deletion
Cloud Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.