- AN0254 · Analytic 0254 — Adversary launches built-in system tools (e.g., whoami, query user, net user) or scripts that enumerate user account information via local execution or remote API queries (e.g., WMI, PowerShell).
- AN0255 · Analytic 0255 — Adversary runs commands like `whoami`, `id`, `w`, or `cat /etc/passwd` from non-interactive or scripting contexts to enumerate system user details.
- AN0256 · Analytic 0256 — Adversary uses `dscl`, `who`, or environment variables like `$USER` to identify accounts or sessions via Terminal or malicious LaunchAgents.
- AN0257 · Analytic 0257 — Adversary executes CLI commands like `show users`, `show ssh`, or attempts to dump AAA user lists from routers or switches.
AdversaryGraph public intelligence page
This page is part of Threat Matrix, the public browser workspace for the main AdversaryGraph platform. Use it for ATT&CK pivots, actor and technique context, similarity leads, detection coverage review, and analyst-ready investigation paths.
Validation disclaimer: TTP overlap, actor similarity, generated summaries, and coverage findings are investigation leads, not attribution proof or operational validation without analyst review.
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System Owner/User Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information. On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
`System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
Observed actors
G0004APT3
G0022Threat Group-3390
G0027Lazarus Group
G0032Sandworm Team
G0034Dragonfly
G0035Stealth Falcon
G0038Patchwork
G0040FIN7
G0046Gamaredon Group
G0047OilRig
G0049APT32
G0050FIN10
G0051Magic Hound
G0059FIN8
G0061APT37
G0067MuddyWater
G0069APT19
G0073Tropic Trooper
G0081APT38
G0082APT39
G0087GALLIUM
G0093Kimsuky
G0094APT41
G0096Wizard Spider
G0102Windshift
G0112Chimera
G0114Sidewinder
G0121HAFNIUM
G0125ZIRCONIUM
G0128Aquatic Panda
G0143HEXANE
G1001Earth Lusca
G1006LuminousMoth
G1014Volt Typhoon
G1017Winter Vivern
G1035Moonstone Sleet
G1036Storm-1811
G1046Medusa Group
G1051MirrorFace
G1054
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Cyber Knowledge context
Use these routes to move from the ATT&CK behavior into explanation, implementation, evidence handling, validation, and defensive operations. Relevance is generated from explicit identifiers/names and governed topic mappings; it is not attribution evidence.
Red Team & Offensive Security · Governed topic match · 66/100Module 6 — Alert triage, investigation, and escalation
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 66/100Module 10 — Cloud, containers, Kubernetes, and SaaS defense
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 66/100Module 2 — Asset, service, identity, and exposure context
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 54/100Module 7 — Endpoint defense and EDR
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 54/100Module 9 — Identity defense and ITDR
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 54/100Web, API, mobile, and application reconnaissance
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Governed topic match · 54/100Module 5 — Threat hunting
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 42/100Module 8 — Network defense, protocol analysis, and NDR
Blue Team & Defensive Security · Governed topic match · 42/100Evidence engineering, control testing, audit, and assurance
Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) · Governed topic match · 36/100Internet exposure, service indexes, and infrastructure search
OSINT & Reconnaissance · Tactic learning route · 24/100Module 5 — Cloud, containers, and Kubernetes
Red Team & Offensive Security · Tactic learning route · 24/100
MITRE mitigations
No ATT&CK mitigation relationship is published for this technique. Apply risk-based controls and verify scope.
MITRE detection strategies and analytics
Continue the investigation
Attack tools, simulations and detection rules
Follow explicit source relationships into the reference modules. Linked procedures and detectors are not claims of live validation or actor attribution.
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery simulation — Exact active technique ID
- T1033 detection rules — Exact active technique ID; not actor-specific detector coverage