Windows Security 4688 — Process creation

Windows Security 4688 — Process creation. A new process was created, with fields that depend on the event version and audit policy.

windows xml process execution

Source and collection

Windows Event Log: Security; archived .evtx is binary, while this fixture is an XML event export.

Configure Audit Process Creation. Read with Get-WinEvent and preserve provider, event ID, version, computer and record ID.

Native example and provenance

publisher documentation example. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.

Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — preformatted example 1

Removed Event Viewer tree expansion markers before XML tags; field values unchanged.

Download the exact sample · Offline research kit

SHA-256: 9cdbbc7df3be3baa9aa092e716a09ce2d12a7a39e33ea4f1d2d5a5a2464b7d28

<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
<System>
 <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}" /> 
 <EventID>4688</EventID> 
 <Version>2</Version> 
 <Level>0</Level> 
 <Task>13312</Task> 
 <Opcode>0</Opcode> 
 <Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords> 
 <TimeCreated SystemTime="2015-11-12T02:24:52.377352500Z" /> 
 <EventRecordID>2814</EventRecordID> 
 <Correlation /> 
 <Execution ProcessID="4" ThreadID="400" /> 
 <Channel>Security</Channel> 
 <Computer>WIN-GG82ULGC9GO.contoso.local</Computer> 
 <Security /> 
 </System>
<EventData>
 <Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data> 
 <Data Name="SubjectUserName">WIN-GG82ULGC9GO$</Data> 
 <Data Name="SubjectDomainName">CONTOSO</Data> 
 <Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x3e7</Data> 
 <Data Name="NewProcessId">0x2bc</Data> 
 <Data Name="NewProcessName">C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe</Data> 
 <Data Name="TokenElevationType">%%1938</Data> 
 <Data Name="ProcessId">0xe74</Data> 
 <Data Name="CommandLine" /> 
 <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-1377283216-344919071-3415362939-1104</Data> 
 <Data Name="TargetUserName">dadmin</Data> 
 <Data Name="TargetDomainName">CONTOSO</Data> 
 <Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x4a5af0</Data> 
 <Data Name="ParentProcessName">C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe</Data> 
 <Data Name="MandatoryLabel">S-1-16-8192</Data> 
 </EventData>
</Event>

Structure and field interpretation

Observed structure in this specific sample
Field/pathSerialized type
Microsoft-Windows-Security-AuditingXML text
EventIDXML text
VersionXML text
LevelXML text
TaskXML text
OpcodeXML text
KeywordsXML text
TimeCreatedXML text
EventRecordIDXML text
CorrelationXML text
ExecutionXML text
ChannelXML text
ComputerXML text
SecurityXML text
SubjectUserSidXML text
SubjectUserNameXML text
SubjectDomainNameXML text
SubjectLogonIdXML text
NewProcessIdXML text
NewProcessNameXML text
TokenElevationTypeXML text
ProcessIdXML text
CommandLineXML text
TargetUserSidXML text
TargetUserNameXML text
TargetDomainNameXML text
TargetLogonIdXML text
ParentProcessNameXML text
MandatoryLabelXML text
System/EventID
Event identifier within the named provider.
System/Version
Version of this event layout.
System/TimeCreated/@SystemTime
Event timestamp in UTC.
EventData
Named fields; use names, not positional array indices.
Relevant fields
NewProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, SubjectLogonId

Investigation uses

Validation boundaries

CommandLine can be empty unless the separate command-line policy is enabled; hexadecimal process IDs can be reused. This sample uses event version 2.

This sample passed byte-integrity and JSON/XML parsing checks, including the catalogue’s specified event discriminators. This is not a complete vendor-schema validation or a tested detection.

For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.

Ecosystem connections

References

Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.