Windows Security 4625 — Failed logon
Windows Security 4625 — Failed logon. A logon attempt failed on the computer recording the event.
Source and collection
Windows Event Log: Security; archived .evtx is binary, while this fixture is an XML event export.
Configure Audit Logon. Read with Get-WinEvent and preserve provider, event ID, version, computer and record ID.
Native example and provenance
publisher documentation example. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.
Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — preformatted example 1
Removed Event Viewer tree expansion markers before XML tags; field values unchanged.
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SHA-256: 169ca6119ee289934e0ac6feb96b0da0a5a9f6faa87828b939ca1aaffc364a4a
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
<System>
<Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}" />
<EventID>4625</EventID>
<Version>0</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>12546</Task>
<Opcode>0</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x8010000000000000</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2015-09-08T22:54:54.962511700Z" />
<EventRecordID>229977</EventRecordID>
<Correlation />
<Execution ProcessID="516" ThreadID="3240" />
<Channel>Security</Channel>
<Computer>DC01.contoso.local</Computer>
<Security />
</System>
<EventData>
<Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectUserName">DC01$</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectDomainName">CONTOSO</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x3e7</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserName">Auditor</Data>
<Data Name="TargetDomainName">CONTOSO</Data>
<Data Name="Status">0xc0000234</Data>
<Data Name="FailureReason">%%2307</Data>
<Data Name="SubStatus">0x0</Data>
<Data Name="LogonType">2</Data>
<Data Name="LogonProcessName">User32</Data>
<Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Negotiate</Data>
<Data Name="WorkstationName">DC01</Data>
<Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>
<Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
<Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessId">0x1bc</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessName">C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe</Data>
<Data Name="IpAddress">127.0.0.1</Data>
<Data Name="IpPort">0</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
Structure and field interpretation
| Field/path | Serialized type |
|---|---|
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing | XML text |
EventID | XML text |
Version | XML text |
Level | XML text |
Task | XML text |
Opcode | XML text |
Keywords | XML text |
TimeCreated | XML text |
EventRecordID | XML text |
Correlation | XML text |
Execution | XML text |
Channel | XML text |
Computer | XML text |
Security | XML text |
SubjectUserSid | XML text |
SubjectUserName | XML text |
SubjectDomainName | XML text |
SubjectLogonId | XML text |
TargetUserSid | XML text |
TargetUserName | XML text |
TargetDomainName | XML text |
Status | XML text |
FailureReason | XML text |
SubStatus | XML text |
LogonType | XML text |
LogonProcessName | XML text |
AuthenticationPackageName | XML text |
WorkstationName | XML text |
TransmittedServices | XML text |
LmPackageName | XML text |
KeyLength | XML text |
ProcessId | XML text |
ProcessName | XML text |
IpAddress | XML text |
IpPort | XML text |
- System/EventID
- Event identifier within the named provider.
- System/Version
- Version of this event layout.
- System/TimeCreated/@SystemTime
- Event timestamp in UTC.
- EventData
- Named fields; use names, not positional array indices.
- Relevant fields
- Status, SubStatus, LogonType, IpAddress
Investigation uses
- Group failures by account, source and status; compare later successes and the account baseline.
- Compare event time with ingestion time and retain the original XML for a reviewable evidence trail.
Validation boundaries
Failures include stale services and mistyped passwords; do not equate a count threshold with password spraying. This sample uses event version 0.
This sample passed byte-integrity and JSON/XML parsing checks, including the catalogue’s specified event discriminators. This is not a complete vendor-schema validation or a tested detection.
For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.
Related sources
Ecosystem connections
- Telemetry Library — ATT&CK data components
- Detection Rules — candidate detection content
- Threat hunting — from intelligence to validated defense
- Practical security learning paths
- AdversaryGraph — evidence-led investigation
References
Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.