Windows Security 4663 — Object access
Windows Security 4663 — Object access. An audited object access was recorded for the configured object and access mask.
Source and collection
Windows Event Log: Security; archived .evtx is binary, while this fixture is an XML event export.
Configure Audit File System or applicable object subcategory plus SACL. Read with Get-WinEvent and preserve provider, event ID, version, computer and record ID.
Native example and provenance
publisher documentation example. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.
Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — preformatted example 1
Removed Event Viewer tree expansion markers before XML tags; field values unchanged.
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SHA-256: 92f9d59eef0a56e300832687a0c72fbcccebf022cdc7f5de9f4a7931d7bfa447
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
<System>
<Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-A5BA-3E3B0328C30D}" />
<EventID>4663</EventID>
<Version>1</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>12800</Task>
<Opcode>0</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2015-09-18T22:13:54.770429700Z" />
<EventRecordID>273866</EventRecordID>
<Correlation />
<Execution ProcessID="516" ThreadID="524" />
<Channel>Security</Channel>
<Computer>DC01.contoso.local</Computer>
<Security />
</System>
<EventData>
<Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-1104</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectUserName">dadmin</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectDomainName">CONTOSO</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x4367b</Data>
<Data Name="ObjectServer">Security</Data>
<Data Name="ObjectType">File</Data>
<Data Name="ObjectName">C:\\Documents\\HBI Data.txt</Data>
<Data Name="HandleId">0x1bc</Data>
<Data Name="AccessList">%%4417 %%4418</Data>
<Data Name="AccessMask">0x6</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessId">0x458</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessName">C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe</Data>
<Data Name="ResourceAttributes">S:AI(RA;ID;;;;WD;("Impact\_MS",TI,0x10020,3000))</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
Structure and field interpretation
| Field/path | Serialized type |
|---|---|
Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing | XML text |
EventID | XML text |
Version | XML text |
Level | XML text |
Task | XML text |
Opcode | XML text |
Keywords | XML text |
TimeCreated | XML text |
EventRecordID | XML text |
Correlation | XML text |
Execution | XML text |
Channel | XML text |
Computer | XML text |
Security | XML text |
SubjectUserSid | XML text |
SubjectUserName | XML text |
SubjectDomainName | XML text |
SubjectLogonId | XML text |
ObjectServer | XML text |
ObjectType | XML text |
ObjectName | XML text |
HandleId | XML text |
AccessList | XML text |
AccessMask | XML text |
ProcessId | XML text |
ProcessName | XML text |
ResourceAttributes | XML text |
- System/EventID
- Event identifier within the named provider.
- System/Version
- Version of this event layout.
- System/TimeCreated/@SystemTime
- Event timestamp in UTC.
- EventData
- Named fields; use names, not positional array indices.
- Relevant fields
- ObjectName, AccessMask, ProcessName, SubjectLogonId
Investigation uses
- Inspect access to sensitive objects and correlate process ID, logon ID and object name.
- Compare event time with ingestion time and retain the original XML for a reviewable evidence trail.
Validation boundaries
Audit policy alone is insufficient without an applicable SACL; access does not establish exfiltration. This sample uses event version 1.
This sample passed byte-integrity and JSON/XML parsing checks, including the catalogue’s specified event discriminators. This is not a complete vendor-schema validation or a tested detection.
For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.
Related sources
Ecosystem connections
- Telemetry Library — ATT&CK data components
- Detection Rules — candidate detection content
- Threat hunting — from intelligence to validated defense
- Practical security learning paths
- AdversaryGraph — evidence-led investigation
References
Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.