Complete technique description
Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailored for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as “spearphishing.” Phishing often involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages.
Mobile phishing may take various forms. For example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Adversaries may also impersonate executives of organizations to persuade victims into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries will often use social engineering techniques in text messages to trick the victims into acting quickly, which leads to adversaries obtaining credentials and other information.
Mobile devices are a particularly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing campaigns. Due to their smaller form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishing attempts over several different vectors, such as:
- SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to convince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurations on their device.
- Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device.
- Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as "vishing") to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing login credentials or navigating to malicious websites. Common vishing targets include employees, especially executives of organizations, and help desks. This may also be used as a technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, but then pivot to a desktop computer by having the victims perform actions on a desktop computer. With the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), adversaries may also use AI to clone a person’s voice, resulting in deepfake vishing. The cloned voice provides familiarity to the victims, increasing the likelihood of successful malicious actions performed by the victims. Additionally, adversaries may leave voicemails, which may use a real person’s voice or an AI-generated voice; these scams would urgently ask victims into calling back to perform an action, e.g. sending money or providing sensitive information and credentials.
Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
File Creation · source-mapped
DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0039",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"action": "create",
"size_bytes": 64
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Network Traffic Content · source-mapped
DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0085",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
"protocol": "http",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/lab-check",
"payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
Network Traffic Flow · source-mapped
DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0078",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
"destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
"destination_port": 443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"bytes_sent": 128,
"bytes_received": 512
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Protected Configuration · source-mapped
DC0115 collection page — Use approved device-management/research-build interfaces to snapshot the specific protected setting; document privileges and unsupported fields.
Providers and collection configuration
- Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
- Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
- Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
- Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
- Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
- Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.
Required normalized fields: device_id, setting, before, after.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0115",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"device_id": "android-lab-1",
"setting": "usb_debugging_enabled",
"before": false,
"after": true
}
}
Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.