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T1458 Replication Through Removable Media — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to bypass application store requirements and install malicious applications directly. In the case of Initial Access, adversaries may attempt to exploit the device via the connection to gain access to data…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to bypass application store requirements and install malicious applications directly.[Lau-Mactans] In the case of Initial Access, adversaries may attempt to exploit the device via the connection to gain access to data stored on the device.[Krebs-JuiceJacking] Examples of this include:

* Exploiting insecure bootloaders in a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location.[IBM-NexusUSB] * Exploiting weakly-enforced security boundaries in Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB.[GoogleProjectZero-OATmeal] * Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly that can exploit some iOS devices using physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode.[Computerworld-iPhoneCracking]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Application Permission · source-mapped

DC0114 collection page — Compare manifest declarations with runtime granted state using authorized package inspection and own-app permission checks.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
  • Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
  • Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
  • Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
  • Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
  • Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: package, permission, declared, granted.

adb shell dumpsys package test.example.lab

Read-only snapshot on a consented debug device. Replace the example package with your owned test app. Output and access vary by Android build; this is not a permission-request event stream.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0114",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "package": "test.example.lab",
    "permission": "android.permission.CAMERA",
    "declared": true,
    "granted": false
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

File Creation · source-mapped

DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0039",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
    "action": "create",
    "size_bytes": 64
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Host Status · source-mapped

DC0018 collection page — Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: asset_id, status, heartbeat_age_seconds, collector_healthy.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0018",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "asset_id": "lab-host-1",
    "status": "degraded",
    "heartbeat_age_seconds": 90,
    "collector_healthy": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Protected Configuration · source-mapped

DC0115 collection page — Use approved device-management/research-build interfaces to snapshot the specific protected setting; document privileges and unsupported fields.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
  • Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
  • Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
  • Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
  • Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
  • Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: device_id, setting, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0115",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "device_id": "android-lab-1",
    "setting": "usb_debugging_enabled",
    "before": false,
    "after": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

System Settings · source-mapped

DC0118 collection page — Use supported settings/service snapshots before and after the lab action; record scope (device/user/profile) and unavailable settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Android logcat: Permitted logs from a consented test device/emulator; output depends on build, permissions and instrumentation.
  • Android dumpsys: Point-in-time service/package state on an authorized development device.
  • Instrumented test application: Own-app permission, API and state callbacks; not universal visibility into other apps.
  • Use a disposable emulator or owned development device with approved debugging. Record OS/API level, app version and instrumentation privileges.
  • Collect only relevant logcat buffers/tags and service snapshots; add explicit own-app instrumentation for events absent from OS logs.
  • Forward sanitized logs and compare before/after state. Remove test data and revoke debugging access after the lab session.

Required normalized fields: device_id, setting, scope, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0118",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "device_id": "android-lab-1",
    "setting": "airplane_mode",
    "scope": "device",
    "before": false,
    "after": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Android tooling does not imply iOS coverage. Standard mobile apps cannot observe all other apps or protected OS internals; MDM status is not full API, filesystem or content telemetry.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0691 Detection of Replication Through Removable Media

MITRE detection strategy

AN1802 Analytic 1802

For Android, detect Replication Through Removable Media by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: File with binary signature (.apk, .dex, .so, .sh) written to app storage or /data/local/tmp/ from USB-mounted path or external storage within $USBInstallWindow$]; Process Creation via Application Vetting / Managed Device Telemetry [Application installed with install_source=adb or install_source=sideload from USB-connected host within $USBInstallWindow$ of USB mode change]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

Platforms: Android.

  • Application Permission — android:DevicePolicyManager; channel DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review.
  • File Creation — mobile:ForensicArtifacts; channel Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: File with binary signature (.apk, .dex, .so, .sh) written to app storage or /data/local/tmp/ from USB-mounted path or external storage within $USBInstallWindow$.
  • Process Creation — mobile:DynamicAnalysis; channel Application installed with install_source=adb or install_source=sideload from USB-connected host within $USBInstallWindow$ of USB mode change.
  • System Settings — android:DevicePolicyManager; channel DevicePolicyManager policy/compliance/security-state queries and SecurityLog events where supported.

AN1803 Analytic 1803

For iOS, detect Replication Through Removable Media from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Host Status via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]; Protected Configuration via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]; System Settings via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

Platforms: iOS.

  • Host Status — iOS:MDM; channel DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries.
  • Protected Configuration — iOS:MDM; channel DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries.
  • System Settings — iOS:MDM; channel DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1458 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Mobile lab instrumentation: Per owned device, app version and permission state: unexpected API/permission changes, background activity and network destinations. OS privacy restrictions and emulator differences limit observability.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Host state and inventory: Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

2 source-documented software associations
  • S0312 WireLurker — malware.

    WireLurker monitors for iOS devices connected via USB to an infected OSX computer and installs downloaded third-party applications or automatically generated malicious applications onto the device.[PaloAlto-WireLurker]

    Exact relationship: relationship--0791f28b-d06f-4fee-9cdb-85a6fd2eed61
  • S0315 DualToy — malware.

    DualToy side loads malicious or risky apps to both Android and iOS devices via a USB connection.[PaloAlto-DualToy]

    Exact relationship: relationship--b7282bf9-63f8-49ad-8ee0-f2ad523a367e

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use owned test devices or emulators, disposable app accounts and test data. Verify platform/version instrumentation; desktop test procedures do not establish mobile coverage.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1458 Replication Through Removable Media; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Replication Through Removable Media, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 824f7d8a37e7893b29e4c6ca6d87b5fbbf3b228ec6384f1a69ee20d523ff59e5. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1001 Security Updates

    Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities.

  • M1003 Lock Bootloader

    Users should ensure bootloaders are locked to prevent arbitrary operating system code from being flashed onto the device.

  • M1006 Use Recent OS Version

    iOS 11.4.1 and higher introduce USB Restricted Mode, which disables data access through the device's charging port under certain conditions (making the port only usable for power), likely preventing this technique from working.[Elcomsoft-iOSRestricted]

  • M1011 User Guidance

    Users should be advised not to use public charging stations or computers to charge their devices. Instead, users should be issued a charger acquired from a trustworthy source. Users should be advised not to click on device prompts to trust attached computers unless absolutely necessary.

  • M1012 Enterprise Policy

    Enterprise policies should prevent enabling USB debugging on Android devices unless specifically needed (e.g., if the device is used for application development).

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Detection and collection

T1458 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.