T1701.002 Windows Command Shell — Attack Simulation

Complete technique description

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems which is used in industrial control system environments. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services (e.g., Telnet, SSH, RDP, etc.)

Batch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.

Adversaries may leverage cmd to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd to execute a single command, or abusing cmd interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.

Within industrial control system networks, adversaries may abuse the use of Windows Command Shell on overlap assets that run on Microsoft Windows operating systems (Workstations, Data Historians, Human Machine Interfaces, Application Servers, Jump Hosts, etc.).

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

• T1701 Command and Scripting Interpreter — parent

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

Before treating a rule as coverage

1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1701.002 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

• Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.

1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use a process simulator or isolated test rig with no connection to production controllers or physical actuators. Preserve safety interlocks; destructive effects require synthetic evidence, not real equipment damage.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

1. Choose one procedure implementing T1701.002 Windows Command Shell; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Windows Command Shell, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity

Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.

Collection fixture

Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.

Native telemetry / backend / real attack

Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 c9ca0ce523a1b5e512060a390415e8aefe8f6d32c5f82d7de81264960c1e1183. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

• mitre-attack