T0800 Activate Firmware Update Mode — Attack Simulation

DC0038 collection page — Select the application event family required by the detection and document its native schema before normalization.

Providers and collection configuration

• Application audit logs: First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.
• OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines: Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.

• Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
• Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
• Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.

Required normalized fields: service, action, actor, record_count, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0038",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "lab-portal",
    "action": "export_requested",
    "actor": "lab-reader",
    "record_count": 3,
    "result": "authorized"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.

DC0108 collection page — Subscribe to supported device alarm/audit channels; retain code, severity, source asset and acknowledgement/clear times.

Providers and collection configuration

• OPC UA audit-capable servers: Auditable actions where supported and enabled; inspect server conformance and vendor documentation.
• Controller, HMI and historian exports: Vendor-specific process values, quality flags, alarms and operational context.
• Independent lab sensors / safety records: Physical-effect corroboration, not a universal cybersecurity log format.

• Agree the measurement points, read-only interfaces, sampling intervals and safety boundary with the process owner. Use a simulator or non-production fixture.
• Subscribe to supported audit/alarm events or approved historian exports. Preserve source timestamp, quality, engineering units, asset/tag identity and clock offset.
• Compare independent measurements and record gaps/latency. Do not enable intrusive polling, change controller logic or alter safety setpoints merely to generate logs.

Required normalized fields: asset_id, alarm_code, severity, active.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0108",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "asset_id": "lab-controller-1",
    "alarm_code": "LAB_COMM_LOSS",
    "severity": "warning",
    "active": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: There is no universal PLC event ID or configuration command. Visibility depends on vendor, protocol and process. An alarm or process deviation demonstrates an effect, not necessarily a cyberattack.

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0078 collection page — Collect Zeek conn.log, Suricata flow events or exporter equivalents, including observation point and sampling settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
• Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
• AWS VPC Flow Logs: IP traffic metadata alternative; no packet payload or DNS answer history, and some traffic is not logged.

• Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
• Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
• Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: source_ip, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, bytes_sent, bytes_received.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0078",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "bytes_sent": 128,
    "bytes_received": 512
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

• Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
• Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
• Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.

• On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
• Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
• For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

MITRE detection strategy

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

• S0604 Industroyer — malware.

  The Industroyer SIPROTEC DoS module places the victim device into firmware update mode. This is a legitimate use case under normal circumstances, but in this case is used the adversary to prevent the SIPROTEC from performing its designed protective functions. As a result the normal safeguards are disabled, leaving an unprotected link in the electric transmission. [Joe Slowik August 2019]

  Exact relationship: relationship--83c8c216-7ff7-4bd3-9db4-573469628d95

• M0800 Authorization Enforcement

  Restrict configurations changes and firmware updating abilities to only authorized individuals.
  

• M0801 Access Management

  All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherently provide strong authentication and authorization functions.
  

• M0802 Communication Authenticity

  Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes.
  

• M0804 Human User Authentication

  Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management

• M0807 Network Allowlists

  Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [Department of Homeland Security September 2016]
  

• M0813 Software Process and Device Authentication

  Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions.
  

• M0930 Network Segmentation

  Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [Department of Homeland Security September 2016]
  

• M0937 Filter Network Traffic

  Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity.