1200KM / simulation
T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: * `wevtutil cl system` *…
Technique description
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit. With administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands: * `wevtutil cl system` *…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Clear Event Logs via VBA
Procedure 1b682d84-f075-4f93-9a89-8a8de19ffd6e; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
- BlackCat Ransomware Full Log Clear
Procedure 83dac837-5685-45ed-b10b-9f047572100b; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
- Delete System Logs Using Clear-EventLog
Procedure b13e9306-3351-4b4b-a6e8-477358b0b498; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
- Clear Logs
Procedure e6abb60e-26b8-41da-8aae-0c35174b0967; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.